

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
IN AFRICA: PROMOTING STABILITY OR CHAOS?

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Strategy

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
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Ntiri, 120 pages.

Africa has recently become strategically important to the US and China, mainly for economic reasons. The US and China, the leading consumers of oil in the world, have devised strategies to secure and expand their interests, especially the quest for resources in Africa. This involves the employment of the DIME instruments of national power to achieve their objectives. The strategies being adopted by both countries in pursuing their interests in Africa differ in principle and implementation.

Many conflicts in Africa have been linked to the ways through which the US and the USSR pursued their policies in Africa during the Cold War. This research seeks to point out the likelihood of the Cold War mechanics being replicated with the increased presence of the US and China in Africa. It examines the possibility of instability increasing from the ways through which China and the US are pursuing their policies in Africa, using Nigeria and Sudan as case studies. The research concludes that although the Cold War model cannot be applied to this new competition, there are similarities that cause concern. The research outlines some recommendations to be adopted to prevent intrastate conflicts or at least to minimize their effects.

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ACRONYMS

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance
AGOA	Africa Growth Opportunity Act
Bpd	Barrels Per Day
CAFC	China-Africa Cooperation Forum
CNOCC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic instruments of power
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Less Developed Country
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MNC	Multi-National Corporation
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PRC	Peoples' Republic of China
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
TSCTI	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative

UN	United Nations
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
US	The United States of America
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republic
WTO	World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As waves of change roll over the international environment, so do policy postures of great powers also change vis-à-vis the various nations on the African continent. (Magyar 1999, 45)

Earl Conteh-Morgan

The Problem Statement

After the demise of the Cold War in 1989, the US, and the international community in general, became more distant to issues relating to Africa. The African continent was given little or no significance when carving policies by the major actors on the world scene. For instance, the end of the Cold War was said to have reinforced the historical tendency of US policy makers to treat Africa as a back-burner issue (Gordon and Gordon 1996, 151). The name of the continent was only mentioned in terms of conflicts and crises. In recent times, however, Africa has assumed greater importance in the international community, especially in the eyes of the US and China, for reasons other than conflict and crisis. These two countries have been identified as the two economic superpowers as well as the two leading consumers of natural resources, especially oil.

The US depends on African sources for a sizeable portion of its oil imports and plans to increase this due to the instability and unreliability of other sources from the Middle East and Venezuela. On the other hand, China's fast rate of technological development has led to astronomical increases in its oil demands, and has thus also turned to Africa and the rest of the oil-producing world for oil. With these two economic giants both trying to access oil and other resources from Africa, the stage seems to be set

for a rivalry between them. The US and China, who are the first and second leading consumers of oil in the world, are likely to devise strategies to secure and expand their interests, especially the quest for resources in Africa. Both countries are likely to employ Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) instruments of power to achieve their objectives.

The strategies to be adopted by both countries in pursuing their interests on the African continent may differ in principle and in implementation. The mechanics of the Cold War are likely to be replicated by China and the US, only this time the superpowers are not formed on ideological lines but rather, on economic lines. In pursuing their individual interests, there are bound to be clashes between the two superpowers on the continent. The effects of these clashes, when not well managed, may lead Africa into another era of conflicts, especially after the economic giants have left the continent. The bitter lessons from the Cold War-related conflicts could serve as reminders to be used to prevent similar situations. Between 1960 and 1990, eighteen civil wars in Africa resulted in about 7 million deaths and spawned 5 million refugees (Adebajo 2002, 1). These losses in human life have contributed significantly to low levels of production with its attendant poverty and lower standards of living on the continent. Development has been slowed down and monies that could have been used in development projects have had to be utilized in executing or resolving conflicts.

The purpose of this study is to examine the likelihood of intrastate conflicts erupting from the ways through which the US and China may pursue their policies in Africa using Nigeria and Sudan as case studies. This is in view of the fact that many of the conflicts on the African continent are linked to the ways through which the US and

the USSR pursued their policies on the continent during the Cold War era. The research will attempt to identify whether the Cold War model of competition can be applied to the ways the US and China are pursuing their interests in Africa. The research will also make recommendations on measures that can be adopted by African states to either prevent the intrastate conflicts or at least to minimize the effects, should they occur and to prevent having to re-learn the lessons from the Cold War.

Background

The People's Republic of China (PRC), on its formation in 1949, based its relations with the developing world on a defined doctrine which they called the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." The PRC used its own legacy of colonial aggression and experience of liberation to forge links with the African nation-states emerging from colonial rule. Although it lacked the resources of the Cold War superpowers in the 1960s, the PRC still invested significantly in support of African liberation movements. The PRC, driven by perceived ideological, anti-imperialist affinities, dispatched Chinese technicians to nominally leftist states to provide military training, modest economic aid and infrastructural monuments to socialist solidarity. In the 1960s and 1970s, the PRC gave aid to socialist nations to build stadiums, hospitals, railroads and other infrastructure. For instance, the PRC was the principal donor in the construction of the Tanzam railway, running from Tanzania to Zambia (Magyar 1999, 113). Relationships were further strengthened with a steady flow of Chinese teachers, doctors and expert engineers into the African states. The era of "liberation wars" in the 1970s also saw China choose sides and patronize its favored forces, as in Angola (Melville and Owen, 2005). This interest receded in the 1980s as Chinese development efforts were diverted

inwards. In this period, Beijing became preoccupied with building socialism with Chinese characteristics back home and thus committed little of its resources into Africa.

The US had traditionally viewed Africa mostly out of anthropological curiosity, expressed more often in the pages of *National Geographic* magazine than in government documents regarding America's diplomatic interests in the world (Magyar 1999, 1). However, with many African states becoming independent in the 1960s, the US recognized the need to get these numerous states in its camp and deny them to its Cold War competitor. Unfortunately, the US underestimated the gravity of the economic problems that followed Africa's wave of independence. The US laid emphasis on the need for African states to adopt economic structures, policies and practices akin to those of the US. America's predisposition towards improving the economic value of Africa dissipated when it realized that the continent lacked the necessary social infrastructure and public institutions. Strategically, the US regretted the expansion of the Cold War to Africa and thus without a credible opponent seeking to exert controls over the continent from 1989, the US left Africa to its own devices in the painful pursuit of domestic political consolidation and legitimacy (Magyar 1999, 13). For the United States, from then on, Africa primarily became the focus for humanitarian interests (Magyar 1999, 152).

Many African states, after gaining independence have experienced one or more military coups at one time or another. Some were successful and led to regime changes whereas others plunged the various countries into internal turmoil and conflicts. Many of these conflicts in Africa were fuelled by superpower rivalries. The US and the former USSR overtly, and sometimes covertly, took sides with opposing factions in individual

countries and showed their support by providing military hardware and training as well as economic assistance. The intensity and levels of escalation in civil wars were made possible by the large quantities of armaments pumped into the continent by the major powers and especially, in the two decades after 1969, by the Soviet Union. Most African countries do not have the capacity to produce weapons. Thus, the scale of warfare experienced over the period would have been unsustainable without an arms inflow measurable in millions of small arms, thousands of tanks and other heavy weapons, and hundreds of sophisticated aircraft. Originally provided in order to strengthen the states of the region, these weapons found their way into the hands of insurgent movements either by capture, or as the result of governments' effort to destabilize their regional rivals. They ultimately weakened and, in the end, virtually destroyed the very states that they had been intended to protect (Furley 1995, 77-78). The Soviets saw Africa as a fertile ground for ambitious probing against its rival in a region where mistakes could be made without lethal consequence to the USSR (Magyar 1999, 5).

As US and USSR interests dominated the continent, the two superpowers held the simmering tensions they had created in check. This led to a certain balance of power which subdued tensions in some parts of Africa. For instance in the Horn of Africa, the interplay of the superpowers was not seen as an arms race so much as a propping of regional hegemonies. Before the early 1970s, Ethiopia was maintained by the US, which had a longstanding client in Haile-Selassie, as a regional hegemony in the Horn. Even though from as early as the mid-1960s the Somali armed forces were armed and trained by the Soviet Union, they were not maintained on a scale which enabled them to pose a serious challenge to Ethiopia, until after the US commitment to Ethiopia declined. During

the final years of Haile-Selassie's reign, the US' reluctance to become involved in further regional conflicts during the Vietnam War coincided with a substantial increase in Soviet arms supplies to Somalia after Siyad Barre took over power in 1969. Although US arms supplies to Ethiopia continued, albeit, on an irregular basis for the first two or three years of the revolution, they did not match the dramatic increase in Soviet weapons shipments to Somalia which reached their peak in 1976-1977 when the danger of American retaliation had virtually disappeared. Thus, it could be argued that US continued support for Ethiopia could have balanced the power play and possibly kept the two states in check to prevent the Ogaden War of 1977-1978 when the Somalis invaded Ethiopia (Furley 1995, 78).

Another example is the eruption of the Liberian Civil War in 1990, immediately after the end of the Cold War. Although it was believed that the brutality of Master Sergeant Doe's rule, coupled with his parochial, ethnic power base, led to a deepening of ethnic divisions and tensions in Liberia, the country was kept stable with US support. The US continued its historic relationship with Liberia and provided substantial military, economic and diplomatic support to maintain Doe's autocratic rule. As of 1984, Washington was assisting Doe in the payment of teachers' salaries, and US private investment in Liberia was the third such investment in Africa, standing at \$5 billion. Doe had already granted the newly created US Rapid Deployment Force staging rights to Liberia's seaports and airports with twenty-four hours' notice (Adebajo 2003, 35). Doe was regarded as a strategic Cold War ally in Africa and received all the support needed to keep the communist and anti-US influences from countries like Libya out of his country. The sudden withdrawal of US support by 1989 had a serious destabilizing effect on

Liberia, leaving a security vacuum that Charles Taylor's Libya-backed invasion attempted to exploit (Adebajo 2003, 20-21).

The African continent was left on its own as the powers that matter in the international community had no strategic interests on the continent. The clear disinterest in Africa was evident after the Cold War as many African nations lost aid and other support due to the loss of sponsorship by either the Soviet Union or the United States. The withdrawal of the superpowers also left the numerous weapons, which were being used to secure their interests, easily accessible by political adventurers. In the light of these, many of the conflicts that emerged after the end of the Cold War could easily be attributed to the rivalry that was so fiercely fought by the superpowers in projecting and protecting their interests and ideologies in Africa.

In recent years, however, Africa seems to have generated the attention of the international community. The US, for instance, has become increasingly interested in African oil as an alternative to Middle Eastern sources. The US' preoccupation with "energy security" makes some African countries, especially Nigeria in West Africa, very important sources of oil. At present, sub-Saharan Africa supplies almost one-fifth of US oil imports. The National Intelligence Council projects that US oil supplies from West Africa will increase to 25 percent by 2015. This would surpass US oil imports from the entire Persian Gulf. Studies indicate that the greatest increase in oil production globally in the next decade is likely to come from West Africa, and the US is following this trend closely (Booker and Colgan 2004).

China's voracious demand for energy to feed its booming economy has led it to seek oil supplies from African countries including Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Angola,

Algeria, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. The US Energy Information Administration indicates that China accounted for 40 percent of total growth in global demand for oil in the last four years. Since 2003, China has toppled Japan as the world's second-largest oil consumer, after the United States. In 2005, Chinese companies invested over \$175 million in African countries, primarily on oil exploration projects and infrastructure. In January 2006, a state-owned Chinese energy company, CNOOC Ltd, announced that it would buy a 45 percent stake in an offshore oil field in Nigeria for \$2.27 billion (Pan 2006).

It is worth mentioning that whereas the majority of the Chinese companies that engage in international businesses are mainly government owned, most US companies are either private or corporate enterprises. This tends to affect the ways businesses from the two powers conduct their affairs. The Chinese companies have the tendency of linking their businesses to government aid and development programs on the continent whereas the US companies do not.

Although both China and the US seem interested in Africa mainly for economic reasons, the US has security interests in Africa as well. The US has identified the ungoverned space of the Sahel region of West Africa as a potential base of training and operations for terrorist networks. The use of failed and failing states by terrorist organizations is also of increasing worry to the US. Africa, with its long history of intra-state conflicts is thus of strategic importance to the US in the Global War on Terrorism (Crupi 2005). The US therefore uses the need to defeat terrorism as one of the factors to motivate its domestic population to support its interaction with Africa.

With time, it is anticipated that the superpowers will find alternatives to the natural resources that make Africa attractive. It is also expected that terrorism, especially against the US, will eventually be defeated. These circumstances may lead to the need for the superpowers to shift their resources into other parts of the world. Whilst still on the continent, most conflicts can be held in check since the superpowers will attempt to protect their interests. For instance, with so much investment in Nigeria, both China and the US have the need to ensure that conflict in the Niger Delta is resolved. This could include providing military as well as economic support for the government's fight against the insurgents. China is actively supporting the government of Sudan in suppressing opposing forces as well as protecting the Sudanese government from international condemnation for its support to Arab militias in the western Darfur region. Such activities by the superpowers tend to help maintain incumbent governments in power and lead to a semblance of stability and peace, which may be sustained for as long as they remain on the continent. Just as was the case during the Cold War, a lid is thus placed on the simmering tensions that would be created by propping up some regimes. Once the superpowers leave the continent, the likelihood of conflicts emerging becomes greater. This is because although they may still have links with the continent, not many resources will be committed by the superpowers into the African continent to help prevent the conflicts. Africa will thus be left to its own devices to handle its own political and economic development. The caveat here is that, just as was the case of Africa after the Cold War, the US and the international community will not forget Africa completely. Africa may again only matter in times of humanitarian assistance but will not generate as much strategic importance as it may enjoy today, especially if the continent's

development process is thwarted by conflicts. It is in the interest of the international community and the US in particular, to make efforts to ensure that Africa's development stays on course so that the continent fits into the current global economic order and does not revert into the abyss in which it found itself in the era immediately after the Cold War. This will prevent the continent becoming a threat to the security of the international community at large.

Research Questions

The primary question the study sets out to answer is whether the ways employed by the US and China in pursuing their interests in Africa are likely to generate conflicts and instability on the continent? To answer this question, the following secondary questions will be addressed:

1. Have the US and China increased their presence in Africa since the end of the Cold War?
2. How are the two superpowers pursuing their interests using the DIME instruments of power?
3. Are there any clashes of interest and ways being employed by the two powers in Africa?
4. How do these clashes compare with Cold War rivalry between the US and USSR in Africa? Does the Cold War model of competition still apply on the continent?
5. How can the African continent position itself to prevent intrastate conflicts and instability as fallouts from the increased competition between the superpowers using lessons learned from the Cold War?

Assumptions

The main assumption is that both the US and China will continue to be divergent on how they pursue their international relations. Whereas the US ties its interactions with developing countries to human rights and democracy, China will continue to view such conditionalities as interference and thus separate politics from business. The two powers are therefore not likely to work together on the African continent even if they find themselves engaged in similar programs in the same country or sub-region.

Another assumption, emanating from the previous assumption, is that African leaders will play the superpowers against each other in an attempt to maximize gains and support from the superpowers. Support from the superpowers will be required to amass more wealth and strengthen political power.

A further assumption is that although most African leaders may profess to avail themselves of the opportunities provided by the superpowers to pursue their national interests of poverty alleviation and economic development, personal selfish interests will still prevail in much of the society.

Finally, an assumption is made that the two powers may eventually leave Africa to its own devices after sometime when their interest in the continent wanes and interests in other parts of the world require greater attention and resources.

Definition of Key Terminologies and Concepts

Some of the terms and concepts used in the study are defined below:

Cold War. This term as used in the context of this study refers to the ideological struggle that existed between the US and the USSR, the two world superpowers, from the end of World War II to 1989. During the Cold War period, international politics were

heavily shaped by the intense rivalry between these two great blocs of power and the political ideologies they represented: democracy and capitalism in the case of the United States and its allies, and Communism in the case of the Soviet bloc. According to Robert Legvold, the Cold War enmity eventually drew the United States and the USSR into local conflicts in almost every quarter of the globe. He pointed out that in the early and mid-1960s the great powers superimposed their competition on local conflicts in Africa. He cited examples of then newly independent nations such as the Republic of the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Nigeria, where the US and the USSR chose sides and lent military backing and other assistance to groups or leaders thought to be sympathetic to their interests (Levgold 2006).

Strategy. The word strategy, as used in this study, will be based on Richard Yarger's analysis in his article "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model." Yarger explains strategy as being the employment of the instruments of power to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives. The objectives of the state are the interests of the state which he defined in the article as "desired end states such as survival, economic well-being, and enduring national values." He further elucidates that strategy is all about how "ways" (concepts) and "means" (resources) are employed by the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve "ends" (objectives) that support the state's interests (Yarger n.d.).

Instruments of Power. This refers to all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2006).

The instruments of power, together, are commonly referred to as DIME. Instruments of power (DIME) are employed by states to achieve their interests. States usually use employ the three peaceful instruments in their interaction with other states and only resort to use of the military instrument of power as a last resort to settle differences. According to Yarger, strategy is the pursuit, protection, or advancement of a nation's interests through the application of the instruments of power.

Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is the world's second largest continent after Asia, and it contains more independent nations than any other continent. Based on commonalities and geographical locations, Africa is divided into many distinct regions. However, the main regions are North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the term used to describe those countries of the African continent that are not considered part of North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). Geographically, the demarcation line is the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. There are 42 countries located on the sub-Saharan African mainland with six island nations which include Cape Verde, The Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sao Tome and Principe.

West Africa comprises the fifteen states that make up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mauritania. The ECOWAS member states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Within the ECOWAS context, Nigeria accounts for 45 percent of regional GDP, 66percent of total exports, and more than half (51 percent) of the population for the region. This

demonstrates the importance of stability and peace in Nigeria for the West African sub-region (Cisse 2004). The West African sub-region is notorious for the many intrastate conflicts that have drawn international attention in the recent past. These include the conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.

East Africa covers a wide geographic area of the land portion of the African continent and the Indian Ocean archipelagos to include Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti. The other countries in the region are Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Madagascar. The region also includes the islands of Seychelles, Comoros and Mauritius. The conflicts in Sudan and Burundi, as well as the genocide in Rwanda, have brought this region to the attention of the international community.

Central Africa includes the countries of Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Although this region abounds in rich natural resources including oil, gold, diamonds and uranium, the region experiences a lot of instability. The DRC is still in the process of recovering from an internal conflict that has been raging on since the early 1990s.

Southern Africa includes the countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Angola, the struggle for power and control between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) threw the country into a civil war spanning over 20 years. Despite these conflicts, Angola was, in 1995, ranked as the fourth largest petroleum market for the US, with Chevron and Texaco having established businesses there (Legum 2001). According to the Energy

Information Administration, Angola was, as of 2005, the seventh largest oil supplier to the US, supplying 306,000 barrels per day (Goldwyn 2005). Zimbabwe has also been in the news with its poor human rights record which has received much condemnation from key actors in the international community apart from China.

Intrastate Conflict. Ross Stagner defines conflict as a situation in which two or more human beings desire goals which they perceive as being obtainable by one or the other, but not both (Mitchel 1981,15). Intra-state conflicts are conflicts within the geographic borders of a state that usually involve the use of violence. Such violence is usually directed at civilians and non-combatants who do not have the means to protect themselves. For instance, in Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army has been terrorizing civilians in the northern part of the country while, in the Darfur region of Sudan, the Janjaweed militia has equally created havoc among civilians in the affected parts of the country. In Cote d'Ivoire, the rebel groups have taken the northern part of the country making the country virtually ungovernable. The causes of intra-state conflicts are many and varied but most conflicts in Africa have been over who controls the political system and eventually, the material resources of the state. The conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire could all be traced to the struggle for political power and personal greed.

China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Under the "International Security Situation" section of the document *China's National Defense*, released by Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 27 July 1998, the five principles of peaceful coexistence are listed as follows:

1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2. Mutual nonaggression.
3. Noninterference in each other's internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful coexistence.

The document outlines further that the five principles are the political basis and premise of global and regional security. It stresses that each country has the right to choose its own social system, development strategy, and way of life, and that no other country should interfere in the internal affairs of any other country in any way or under any pretext, much less resort to military threats or aggression (China.org. 2003).

Intervention. David Gibbs, in his book on “The Political Economy of Third World Intervention,” indicates that a country is an interventionist when it deliberately manipulates the internal policies of another country. He explains that intervention, unlike conventional aggression which aims at seizing territory, does not affect the formal sovereignty of the country which is the object of intervention. Although the country will retain its sovereignty by retaining its territory and identifying features like its own flag and other paraphernalia, its government and policies will, to a large extent, reflect the interests of the intervening country. According to Gibbs, intervention can be accomplished through invasion, followed by the establishment of a puppet government which is subservient to the interests of the invader. This study will however consider the more subtle means of intervention which include bribing government officials, helping governments to repress insurrections or helping insurgents to overthrow a sitting government. Other subtle means include promoting political disorder through financing opposition parties and newspapers, coercing legislators to vote against the government, or

supporting a coup d'état against the government (Gibbs 1991, 9). Allen Dulles, the first chief of the Clandestine Services of the CIA once wrote that "Where there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist takeover is threatened . . . we can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid" (Marchetti and Marks 1974, 26). Intervention by the superpowers into other states is usually to rid those countries of the competitor's influence.

Limitations

Due to the contemporary nature of the subject, very little information has been documented in the form of books. This will put a limitation on the availability of published material on the subject matter. Much of the information for this work will however be derived from articles and journals.

Projections made in the oil industry that are available for this work tend to vary significantly depending on the slant the author puts on an article. The research will therefore be limited by constraining the use of data to those from a very limited number of sources.

Delimitations

The study will determine whether there are any similarities between how the competition between the US and the USSR played out on the African continent as compared to how the US and China are pursuing their policies today. Any similarities identified will then be analyzed to determine the likelihood of intrastate conflicts erupting. Although the causes of conflicts on the African continent are many and varied,

the scope of this paper will focus on conflicts whose causes could be linked to Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR.

Although the African countries are quite diverse, as developing countries they all tend to have similar foreign and economic policies. Since it will be next to impossible to discuss all the countries on the continent, the study will mainly concentrate on Nigeria and Sudan as case studies. Nigeria is the largest and most populous country in West Africa and as a major exporter of oil has been a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 1971. The US and China both have significant investments in the oil industry in Nigeria with the US depending on Nigeria as the fifth largest supplier of US oil needs. Sudan which is an East African country, on the other hand, until recently was an importer of oil until China's intervention. Sudan accounts for about 6 percent (over 200,000 bpd) of China's oil imports. Although US oil companies used to operate in the country, they no longer have a presence there and China has ultimately assumed a leading role in oil investment with about \$4 billion worth of investments (Markman 2006).

With regard to the contemporary nature of this topic, the study will be limited to events that occur not later than 28 February 2007. Any occurrences related to the issues raised in this study that occur after this date shall be beyond the scope of this paper.

Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is linked to the fact that all states put their national interests first in their interaction with other states. Although the two economic giants are both interested in the rich natural resource base of African states, their approaches to gaining access to Africa differ. Whereas the US tries to make human rights and

democratic change important issues, China is prepared to work with any state irrespective of the system of governance in place. The differences in approach are likely to lead to a competition between the two countries in securing footholds in Africa. The two powers will adopt and implement policies that promote their national interests in Africa, whether in support of their respective states or their citizens and their investments. Whether Africa benefits from the economic and security incentives that will be dangled in their faces depends on how stability is managed. It behooves African leaders to look beyond the short term gains associated with the competition between the two superpowers to ensure that instability and conflicts do not erupt. Understanding that conflicts are likely to erupt from the competition between the superpowers will go a long way to assist in adopting measures to either prevent the conflicts or at least to minimize the effects. The study will thus aim at identifying the key factors that will emerge from the competition between the US and China and look at how they compare to the factors that led to conflicts because of US/USSR Cold War competition.

After the demise of the Cold War in 1989, the US, and the international community in general, became more distant to issues relating to Africa. The African continent was given little or no significance when carving policies by the major actors on the world scene. For instance, the end of the Cold War was said to have reinforced the historical tendency of US policy makers to treat Africa as a back-burner issue (Gordon and Gordon 1996, 151). The name of the continent was only mentioned in terms of conflicts and crises. In recent times, however, Africa has assumed greater importance in the international community, especially in the eyes of the US and China, for reasons other

than conflict and crisis. These two countries have been identified as the two economic superpowers as well as the two leading consumers of natural resources, especially oil.

The US depends on African sources for a sizeable portion of its oil imports and plans to increase this due to the instability and unreliability of other sources from the Middle East and Venezuela. On the other hand, China's fast rate of technological development has led to astronomical increases in its oil demands, and has thus also turned to Africa and the rest of the oil-producing world for oil. With these two economic giants both trying to access oil and other resources from Africa, the stage seems to be set for a rivalry between them. The US and China, who are the first and second leading consumers of oil in the world, are likely to devise strategies to secure and expand their interests, especially the quest for resources in Africa. Both countries are likely to employ the DIME instruments of power to achieve their objectives.

The strategies to be adopted by both countries in pursuing their interests on the African continent may differ in principle and in implementation. The mechanics of the Cold War are likely to be replicated by China and the US, only this time the superpowers are not formed on ideological lines but rather, on economic lines. In pursuing their individual interests, there are bound to be clashes between the two superpowers on the continent. The effects of these clashes, when not well managed, may lead Africa into another era of conflicts, especially after the economic giants have left the continent. The bitter lessons from the Cold War-related conflicts could serve as reminders to be used to prevent similar situations. Between 1960 and 1990, eighteen civil wars in Africa resulted in about 7 million deaths and spawned 5 million refugees (Adebajo, 2002. 1). These losses in human life have contributed significantly to low levels of production with its

attendant poverty and lower standards of living on the continent. Development has been slowed down and monies that could have been used in development projects have had to be utilized in executing or resolving conflicts.

The purpose of this study is to examine the likelihood of intrastate conflicts erupting from the ways through which the US and China may pursue their policies in Africa, using Nigeria and Sudan as case studies. This is in view of the fact that many of the conflicts on the African continent are linked to the ways through which the US and the USSR pursued their policies on the continent during the Cold War era. The research will attempt to identify whether the Cold War model of competition can be applied to the ways the US and China are pursuing their interests in Africa. The research will also make recommendations on measures that can be adopted by African states to either prevent the intrastate conflicts or at least to minimize the effects, should they occur and to prevent having to relearn the lessons from the Cold War.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In most cases of limited war in this century it is as true today as when Thucydides wrote that “it is not in Attica that the war will be decided . . . but in the countries by which Attica is supported. (1967, 200)

McClintock

Introduction

This chapter sets to review existing literature relating to the issues raised in the research. The chapter seeks to provide the reader a framework within which the analysis of the US/China competition will be looked at. The literature review is divided into three parts. The first part will review literature on US-China relations and will emphasize the suspicion with which the countries regard each other in order to establish that the two countries are in a kind of competition which will affect how they conduct themselves in Africa. The second part looks at Cold War intervention of superpowers in Africa and will seek to establish that Africa is still prone to superpower intervention. This section will attempt to set conditions for making a comparison between Cold War competition between the US and the USSR with the competition for resources between the US and China. The last part of the chapter highlights both US and China’s relations with Africa and will focus on current interactions by the two powers, particularly with regards to Nigeria and Sudan.

The Relationship between the United States and China

In *The Coming Conflict with China* by Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro (1997), the authors give an informed and illuminating examination of a high-stakes clash of competing ideologies and economic interests between the US and China. Although the book is written against the backdrop of events that took place in the period immediately after the end of the Cold War, especially in Asia, much of the analysis made still holds good for present day relations between the two powers beyond the Asian continent. The authors point out that although there is much public display of gestures of warmth and harmony between the two states, underlying this “strategic partnership” is a myriad of issues that tend to negate these aspirations.

Bernstein and Munro conclude in their analysis that China and the US will be the major global rivals in the first decades of the twenty-first century, in terms of all the DIME instruments of power, which they spell out as military strength, economic well-being, influence among other nations and values, and practices that are accepted as international norms. They base this assertion on the premise that whereas China, after years of struggle, is gradually taking up the great power role that it believes to be its historic legacy and thereby making moves to be a dominant power, the US pursues a consistent goal of preventing any other single state from forming a hegemony in its sphere of influence. The authors thus point out that this collision of interests and goals led to the great game in East Asia, involving the balance of power, with China emerging to threaten a rough equilibrium that was guaranteed and overseen by the US and which had endured since the end of World War II. They cite numerous examples to reflect the official Chinese position of “We will never seek hegemony” but point out that there are

good reasons for skepticism, and that China's move toward [Asian] hegemony is virtually inevitable. The writers are quick to refute the notion that as China becomes more prosperous and democratic, it will become more moderate in its behavior and thus less likely to engage in aggressive and reckless activities. They postulate, rather, that China's economic power and leverage will push it to greater aggressiveness and further defiance of international opinion which will put it in a conflict position vis-à-vis the US.

Chinese military development is covered in detail by Bernstein and Munro where they point out that the Chinese, who had been constrained by budget limitations, were stunned by the allied victory in Desert Storm which prompted them to start procuring new weapons. "Fighting modern local wars under high-tech conditions in the future" became the new Chinese maxim. They focused on nuclear and missile forces as well as air, naval, and marine forces capable of projecting military power increasingly farther from China's shores. With an arsenal of nuclear-tipped missiles that could reach the continental United States, China could assume a similar position as the former USSR, vis-à-vis the US, where the threat of the use of nuclear weapons led to a "balance of power" in international discourse.

Although *The Coming Conflict with China* is focused on China's hegemonic ambitions in Asia, the issues raised by the writers are quite similar to the ways many commentators view the interrelationship between the US and China in Africa today. This paper seeks to infer that the competition between China and the US, as outlined above, is likely to lead to conflict. To prevent escalation and destruction of both powers, these conflicts may be settled in places, such as Africa, like the proxy wars of the Cold War era. For instance, Bernstein and Munro used Chinese intervention into Vietnam to show

that China, is willing to use military force outside its borders in attempts to gauge what the response of other nations will be, how strong their political will is, and who will come to the country's aid.

Dr James Tang, a Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) fellow, in his article *With the Grain or Against the Grain? Energy Security and Chinese Foreign Policy in the Hu Jintao Era* (2006), tries to examine whether China's growing energy needs are insatiable and if this could lead to a resource war with other energy-consuming countries, such as the US. He makes reference to David Zweig and Jianhai Bi's power transition theory in which they warn that although China's energy demands may not be a source of conflict with the West in the long term, China and the US are both uneasy about the situation. The theorists point out that the US, as the world's hegemon, needs to make room for China as a rising giant in order to prevent war which is a serious possibility (Zweig and Bi, cited in Tang 2006, 2). Tang supports the idea that there are concerns about potential conflict between the US and China by depicting the gap between China's energy production and requirements. He indicates that this gap has driven China to pursue resources abroad, especially in Africa, leading to worries in the US and the West that China would disrupt the existing oil supply through the acquisition of overseas assets in the energy field. Other sources of worry for the West include China's trade with, and support of repressive regimes that have been isolated by the West for humanitarian and poor governance reasons, as well as China's interest in developing military capabilities to protect the safety of its oil sources and transportation routes. These are of major concern to the US in Africa where China continues to expand its influence as well as its support for repressive regimes such as those in Sudan and Zimbabwe. Tang cites the 2006

National Security Strategy Report in which the White House, while acknowledging that Chinese leaders had proclaimed their commitment to peaceful development, also points out that China cannot stay on the peaceful path while holding onto old ways of thinking and acting. The report elaborates on “old ways” as the continuation of China’s military expansion in a non-transparent way, expanding trade but seeking to direct markets rather than opening them up, and supporting resource-rich countries without regard to misrule or misbehavior of those regimes. It is worth mentioning that although all these tensions may exist, diplomats from both the US and China go to lengths to try and assuage public perceptions of these tensions by displaying to the public and the international community that all is well between the two super powers. For instance, Tang cites President Hu’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2005 in which President Hu indicated that China is committed to peace, development and cooperation in its development. He is reported to have stated thus, “instead of hurting or threatening anyone, [China’s development] can only serve peace, stability and common prosperity in the world.” (Hu Jintao, cited in Tang 2006, 11)

In his conclusion, Tang identifies the fact that China, in its expansion, does not want to damage its relations with the US, and the West in general. He indicates that so far, China has remained cautious and continues to seek cooperation rather than confrontation with other major powers, including the US. China’s cautiousness notwithstanding, he points out that the energy issue has further complicated the already complex US-China relationship. He is quick to add that how the two countries approach the energy security problem in a responsible manner may prove critical to the future of the world. This is important to the gist of this research since it is believed that

irresponsible handling of the competition between the two powers in Africa could lead to instability on the African continent. This is seen in light of the suspicion with which both powers view each other. China has, for some time, obviously seen its relations with the US as being thorny with the US potentially drawing China into a conflict. The State Council of the PRC, in 1996 issued the following statement about the US:

As long as China remains a socialist country with the Communist Party in power and as long as China does not adopt the American style political system, no matter how much Chinese economy develops, how much democracy is introduced in politics, and how much human rights is improved [the United States] will just look but not see and listen but not hear. As what people often said, “prejudice is worse than ignorance.” . . . [The United States is just] using human rights [issue] to interfere in Chinese domestic politics and promote hegemonism and power-politics. (Press Office of the State Council 1996, cited in Chad-Son, 2005)

On the other hand, very few commentators tend to look at the US-China relationship from a non-confrontational viewpoint. Among the few available works based on this concept is Phillip C. Saunders’ *China’s Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools* (2006). In this article, Saunders concedes that China’s global influence is increasing but adds that it still has to operate within the framework of global institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO) which were either established by, or largely led by the US. In a world that is increasingly becoming more and more globalized, there are more incentives to work within these institutions rather than challenging them. This could have the effect of subjecting China’s growth to the scrutiny and control of the West, and the US in particular. The author points out that although China’s increasing global activism will inevitably affect US interests, which may lead to a competitive relationship, this relationship is not a zero-sum competition. He concludes that both countries have common and conflicting interests, and that there is considerable scope for cooperation between the two.

This research work, however, tends to lean more towards the camp of commentators who believe that China's rise to challenge the US as the unipolar hegemon has the tendency of generating competition which also has the propensity to lead to conflicts. This position is supported by Joseph S. Nye, Jr in the opening chapter of *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (2005). In this book, Nye explains the underlying theories, as well as the causes of war by using the historic example of the war between Sparta and Athens in 431 BC. He posits that Thucydides, the great historian, after recounting various events came to the conclusion that the actual cause of the war was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta. He therefore links the inevitability of war to the rise of a nation to challenge the position being held by another state. In this regard, the question is whether the rise of China and its superpower ambitions, which are causing some level of worry among US strategists, could lead to "war" or a similar competition, as was manifest between the US and the USSR during the Cold War?

Interdependence and Cold War Intervention in Africa

African states have historically been prone to intervention because of their predisposition to dependence. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi (1999) closely analyze aspects that relate to the reasons behind this dependency syndrome in their book on *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*. This book provides a theoretical and conceptual framework for analyzing international relations. It explains the basic assumptions that various writers bare their views on when discussing how states and non-state actors relate to each other in world politics. The authors emphasize realism, pluralism/liberalism and globalism as the three main alternate

perspectives of international relations theory. In explaining interdependence, the authors tend to dwell more on liberalism and globalism and rebuff most of the realist assumptions. The liberal construct, contrary to realism, considers the role of non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) as very important in an ever increasing interdependent world economy. This view is very important in looking at the role of MNCs in their interaction with states in Africa. The liberalists argue that MNCs are even capable of circumventing the authority of the state. Globalists also contend that states and other entities interact in the international system which has emerged as a world capitalist system. Although the system conditions and constrains the behavior of all states and societies, some benefit and others do not benefit from this capitalist system. The globalists concern themselves with the development and maintenance of dependency relations among northern, industrialized states and the poor, underdeveloped or less developed countries (LDCs) of the Third World. They argue that the structure of the global political economy has developed in such a manner, intentionally and unintentionally, as to keep the LDCs underdeveloped and dependent on the rich northern states. The LDCs have missed the globalization train and have little chance of ever effectively catching up with its caboose.

The globalist view is shared by Kalevi J. Holsti in *The State, War, and the State of War* (1996), where he traces such dependency to imperialism. Holsti argues that Third World states are made and kept weak as a means of assuring industrial countries' access to resources and maintaining their dependence on outsiders. He points out that weak, dependent states offer privileges and terms for the operation of MNCs that would not be available in countries with real governments, tax systems, and regulations. He links this

situation to human greed and cites Johan Galtung's work (1971) which mentions the "local comprador bourgeoisie, who stand to reap large personal benefits acting as middlemen and the siphon hose through which surplus value flows from the peripheries to the centers" (Holsti 1996,137). He posits that because they help establish and sustain an exploitative relationship, the comprador bourgeoisie weaken the state by creating and amplifying class cleavages within the country. This analysis is essential to this research in that so long as personal greed continues to thrive in African societies, the leadership of many states will continue to act as the comprador bourgeoisie, weaken the states, and eventually plunge the states into conflict situations. Mention should however be made of Holsti's view, in this book, on great-power competition as a source of wars in the Third World. He believes that rather than causing both intra- and interstate conflicts, Cold War competition promoted and exacerbated these conflicts in the Third World. He uses records to show that Cold War competition actually caused few armed conflicts but did frequently prolong and escalate them.

What Went Wrong with Africa? A Contemporary History by Roel van der Veen (2004) looks at the recent history of Africa and explores the causes of widespread poverty, the AIDS epidemic, misrule, corruption and disintegration that have kept many African states out of the worldwide rise in prosperity. The author looks at the historical setting of Africa from the era of colonization, through independence and the period during and after the Cold War. He emphasizes the linkages among politics, economic, social relations and culture in analyzing Africa's present predicament. Most importantly, van der Veen, in analyzing the interaction between the internal and international aspects of Africa's situation, highlights the role of Africa's ruling elites. The author indicates that

until the mid-1970s, when the Eastern Bloc countries did not show much interest in Africa, most African governments just aligned themselves with Western patrons to guarantee their domestic position. However, when the US declined in stature because of commitments in other parts of the world, the Soviet Union stepped up its activities worldwide and African leaders then were faced with the difficult choice to select patrons. He cites the case of Ethiopia and Somalia who simply kept switching allegiance from one superpower to the other. Van der Veen points out in his book that Cold War intervention had major consequences for the security situation in Africa in that superpower rivalry increased the tension surrounding local conflicts. He stressed that superpower rivalry in Africa served as a “release valve” for the aggression of the superpowers who were unable to engage each other directly because of the nuclear deterrence. Even in Africa, the two powers were careful not to draw their own or allied armed forces into direct confrontation. This led to a situation that was perceived as stable although underlying this semblance of peace were bitter rancor and hatred amongst the populace. Thus, after the Cold War, African actors, who were no longer restrained by their superpower patrons, resorted to settling their differences and old scores freely. In essence, the Cold War rivalry created tensions within Africa which erupted once the superpowers reduced their presence on the continent.

Africa in World Politics: Post Cold War Challenges edited by John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (1995), explores Africa’s changing status in international relations by looking at the historical, economic and cultural factors that have shaped the continent’s current standing in world affairs. The book is a collection of works by some renowned experts on African affairs and includes analyses of some of the conflicts that

have attracted worldwide attention to Africa as well as an examination of the relations between the continent and other regions and powers. Of particular significance in these works is the issue of economic failings of African states. The book addresses the major point that Africa's economic and politico-strategic marginalization in the 1980s led to underdevelopment and poverty which resulted in instability. It also makes it clear that dependence on external actors, especially the IMF and the World Bank, for developmental policies were not very beneficial. The presence of weak state structures makes the economies less viable and therefore dependent on external actors for sustainability. In addressing the effects of intervention on the African continent, the authors assert, for example, that although US policy succeeded in containing communism, it generally failed to promote development which could have curtailed some of the conflicts. They cite six countries that benefited most from US economic and military assistance between 1962 and 1988, (Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire) with five of them having experienced bloody civil wars. This analysis is important in asserting that interventionist states pursue agenda that may be different from what may be desirable to the host nations.

Africa and the International Political System edited by Timothy M. Shaw and Sola Ojo (1982) is one of the very first works by Africans on International Relations. The book discusses how Africa fitted into the international system historically, its status at the time of publication and looked ahead to prescribe how Africa should interact with the rest of the world to achieve development. The authors pointed out that due to African states' dependence on industrial powers both strategically and economically, the continent easily opened up for the introduction of troops and weapons to protect regimes that supported

the industrial powers. The authors link this phenomenon to the numerous changes in the foreign policy direction of African countries anytime there is a regime change. This was because, invariably, the numerous coup d'états in Africa were sponsored by one power or the other to safeguard their interests. African governments thus became puppets of the industrial powers who controlled their economic and foreign policies.

In discussing the influence of external actors on internal conflicts, Jacob Bercovitch and Judith Fretter in their collection *Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to 2003* (2004), indicated that superpower rivals can fight “proxy” wars by supporting opposing factions in a civil conflict. They cited the example of the Angolan civil war in which the US supported Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrilla group, while the Soviets backed the governing Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA). The writers explained that indirect support from external actors could take the form of sending arms and providing training and advisers for one faction in the conflict. Their book is mainly a chronology of various conflicts that have emerged worldwide between 1945 and 2003.

Conflict in Africa edited by Oliver Furley (1995) examines African conflicts based on a multi-disciplinary analysis of the roots of these conflicts. The various contributors emphasize both internal and external political and economic influences as well as a general overview of other causes of conflicts. Mention is also made of the impact of conflicts on the economies of the African states which result in a slower pace of development, poverty and further conflicts. The book looks at the role of Cold War superpowers in bolstering regimes that supported the East or West ideologically in exchange for aid, technology, personnel, and arms. The authors point out that for stable

states, the Cold War competition was akin to a golden era, but where conflicts arose, the competition had an effect of exacerbating internal conflicts through the interference of the big powers. It is intimated in this book that since the African continent's capacity to produce its own weapons is minimal, the scale of warfare experienced between 1969 and 1989 could not have been sustainable without significant arms inflow from the superpowers. The writers contend that although the weapons might originally have been meant for the strengthening of the states in Africa, they sometimes fell into the hands of insurgent movements, either by capture, or as a result of governments' efforts to destabilize their regional rivals. This point brings into focus a significant aspect of interventionism where African states competed among themselves for superpower patronage. This resulted in neighboring countries engaging in destabilizing machinations against each other. Cross border incursions became a common phenomenon, as has been the case of Ghana and Togo, where elite non-complementarities have largely been influenced by their leaders' ideological differences which were based on linkages to sponsors from developed countries. The book draws attention to the fact that by propping up some African leaders through the importation of armaments and other means, the interventionists tend to give these leaders a sense of absolute power which has always been counter-productive.

The general theme that runs through most of the literature reviewed so far, points to the consensus that superpower intervention in Africa seems to have exacerbated existing conflict situations rather than being the major cause of them. Conflicts are a normal aspect of man's daily life but the issues that tend to push such conflicts to

proportions that lead to massive loss of lives and significant damage to property are what this research focuses on.

The United States of America's Relations with Africa

United States Interests and Policies in Africa: Transition to a New Era edited by Karl P. Magyar (1999). This book is a collection of works on how the US has related to the five sub-regions in Africa. The works reflect the changes that took place in US policy formulation based on the perceived relevance of the five regions to the US. The book presents a historical chronology of America's interests in Africa which is traced back to the eighteenth century, through the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885, up to and including the first term of the Clinton administration. According to the writers, the US saw Africa more as a continent to be studied for anthropological reasons rather than a continent to share diplomatic ties with. Africa generated some attention from the US in the period around the attainment of independence, for reasons associated with Cold War competition. The writers however contend that the inconsistent policy focus of the US as it relates to Africa is a reflection of how lowly Africa is rated in America's global diplomatic concerns. This position, according to the writers, is portrayed by the generally inconclusive evaluation of America's interest in Africa over time. In the introductory chapter, the editor of the book cites various analysts who assessed aspects of Africa's importance to the US at different times and concluded that all the analysts agreed on the low rating of Africa on the scale of US foreign policy priorities. In the period up to the 1960's, Africa's importance revolved around it being a physical obstacle to other points on the globe, source of military supplies and a surrogate battle terrain, among others, with little or no concern about the human inhabitants of the continent. After some time,

although, there was still greater emphasis on the physical features, African countries' voting trends in the UN and the continent's underdevelopment which became of concern to analysts of US-Africa relations. Mention is also made, in later times, of Africa's vast oil and mineral resources, trade opportunities, strategic location and the influence of the African-American population in the US. Also given some attention was the fact that Africa's conflicts involved external intervention as well as external manipulation of Africa due to economic stagnation.

The basic theme of the book seems to center on the fact that, although the US officially operated from a position of great uncertainty, it became more involved in Africa at the height of the Cold War. Thus with the end of the Cold War and the absence of any credible opponent seeking to exert control over Africa, Magyar rightly projected that the US was expected to disengage from military interventionism and limit the frequency of humanitarian involvement in Africa.

Beyond Constructive Engagement: United States Foreign Policy toward Africa edited by Elliot P. Skinner (1986). This book is a collection of essays prepared for a conference on *United States Policy toward Africa*, which was held on September 19-20, 1984, in Washington, DC. Although most of the essays invariably referred to the US' policy of "constructive engagement" in its dealings with apartheid South Africa, a lot of emphasis was placed on issues relating to US initiatives in the rest of Africa. In discussing US economic policies toward Africa, one of the writers develops and points out a high degree of correlation between American aid dollars and their military and political interests. The writer cites US economic aid distribution in 1984 in which \$564 million was allotted to nine favored countries (Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Niger, Senegal,

Liberia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, and Cameroon) with thirty-six other countries receiving a total of \$379 million. Sudan, Kenya and Somalia, apart from their strategic location along the Red Sea through which so much oil is transported to the West, were of importance to the US in checking the spread of Soviet influence which was already rooted in Ethiopia. The writers allude to the danger of limiting aid to countries having special security value to the US. They point out that the resultant inequity in development or economic well being has a destabilizing effect on the continent as a whole, although such aid may be a boon to an impoverished society.

In looking at military initiatives in Africa, the book points out that most governments view superpower military bases as political liabilities which are potentially socially disruptive. This notwithstanding, the US has had the tendency of using African bases as launching pads such as the idea of basing a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in Kenya rather than in the Middle East because it was feared this could destabilize already shaky Arab regimes in oil-rich countries. Thus, although having the bases could be detrimental to the well being of the African states, for purposes of serving US political interests, ways have been found to ensure the US interests prevailed.

In a research work entitled *US Foreign Policy towards Africa: Commitment or Empty Rhetoric* by Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline E. Cumbo (2003), the author asserts that although the African continent is of vital interest to the US, US strategy of engagement lacks true commitment and is filled with nothing more than empty rhetoric. The author looks at the verbal commitments made in the Clinton Administration against the backdrop of a Republican-led congress' resolve of not providing funds via foreign aid to Africa. She is however quick to point out that the Conference on Africa was a great

attempt to show that the US remained committed to a more proactive approach to dealing with African issues. The writer uses the 2002 National Security Strategy document to claim that although the Bush Administration recognizes the significance of deteriorating conditions in Africa, very little was being done at that time to reduce the incidence of issues like HIV/AIDS and widespread poverty. Again, although much talk is made of a shift in US policy in line with “trade for aid” as the new direction, Africa still accounts for an almost insignificant percentage of overall US foreign trade. An interesting perspective of US security assistance to Africa, in terms of the highly touted African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), is the insistence by the US Congress on the type of training to be carried out. The writer suggests that although a more robust peace enforcement type of training would have suited conditions on the continent, congressional support for funding was withheld until major changes were made to limit training to traditional peacekeeping. Thus the significance of institutions in influencing how US foreign policy is pursued is highlighted here.

The Chance to Go Deep: US Energy Interests in West Africa by Daniel Morris (2006), is an article which looks at the efforts being made to replace more than 75 percent of America’s oil imports from the Middle East by 2025. The writer opines that since President Bush, in his 2006 State of the Union speech, conceded that alternative fuels are in the research stage and did not offer other policy decisions to limit the importation of fuel, African oil is the answer to the problem. Morris consistently refers to private firms like Exxon Mobil Corporation and Vanco Energy as being in the forefront of the US drive into African energy fields. He states that although there are benefits to be gained, there are risks and challenges that accompany doing business in Africa. Among the

myriad of challenges, the writer focuses on terrorism, transparency and corruption as well as the increased presence of China in Africa. He indicates that although West Africa has not drawn transnational terror networks like Al Qaeda into much of its territory, conditions in countries like Nigeria may negate this assertion in the very near future. He discusses US military initiatives in the region with much emphasis on the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI) and its impact on Nigeria. He also addresses the issue of tensions surrounding the exploration of oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and projects that the oil industries, like Shell, will eventually leave Nigeria with decreasing onshore and shallow-water production.

Donovan C. Chau of the Strategic Studies Institute, in a monograph entitled *Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa* (2007), discusses the use of non-violent instruments of grand strategy by the US and China to influence African governments and people. In relation to the US, Chau focuses on US Governmental organizations and agencies that have the ability to provide economic aid and developmental assistance as well as the ability to train, equip and arm military and security forces. He also discusses the impact of US nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), like Mercy Corps and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), along with other organizations and agencies that conduct exchange visits and make public pronouncements on policy.

Terrence Lyons, writing on “Great Powers in the Horn of Africa” in *Cooperative Security: Reducing Third World Wars* (1995) points out that in Sudan, the US showed very little concern about the massive starvation and human rights violations associated with the country’s internal conflict. The US reduced its relations with Sudan to the bare

minimum and all bilateral assistance, except humanitarian aid, was cut off. This was in view of the fact that Sudan had been added to the list of states that sponsored terrorism, making Sudan a pariah state in Washington's judgment. Lyons stresses, however, that the sanctions were not sufficient to end the conflict since the war continues to rage on. Sudan was again listed as one of seven state sponsors of terrorism in the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* document released by the White House in February 2003.

China's Relations with Africa

The PRC has always used its own legacy of colonial aggression and experience of liberation to forge links with the African nation-states since their attainment of independence from colonial rule. The PRC has also consistently based its relations with the developing world on a defined doctrine which they call the "five principles of peaceful coexistence." In several areas, the PRC, very much unlike the Western countries have turned a blind eye to the political situation pertaining in the countries with which they interact.

Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations edited by Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen (1980), is a collection of essays on different aspects of Russian and Chinese aid to Africa in the 1980s. The writers set out to highlight that China's involvement in Africa within the period in question was mainly one of reaction to real or imagined Soviet efforts to gain influence in the region. The writers proceeded to suggest that in Central Africa for instance, China's policy continued to have an economic interest attached to it, granting assistance to groups with very poor international standing. The writers, however, point out that although China's foreign policy with respect to Africa may be reactive and ad hoc, China could be seen to be fashioning a new international

order. This involved uniting the small and medium-sized countries of the world to challenge the superpower hegemonism of the US and the USSR.

Philip Snow's *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (1988) traces the history of China's interaction with Africa in pre-colonial times to the late 1980s. He emphasizes that although the Chinese had taken a low profile in the late 1980s, they had not disappeared from the African scene. Even whilst not being very much in the picture, Snow contends that the Chinese were constantly nudging African states about the need for developing countries to join forces in the battle for prosperity. The writer describes China's encounter with Africa as one that "has taken the form of a series of descents made upon the continent in the course of many centuries, massive, sometimes brilliant, often benevolent, but so far oddly ephemeral." This book is important in the sense that most of the issues raised keep coming up, even in China's recent interaction with Africa. For instance, Chinese laborers were shipped en masse to South African mines in 1904, a practice which is being repeated and thus creating some concern in some African countries where Chinese companies are currently operating.

In Chau's *Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: US Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa* (2007), the writer also traces China's involvement in African affairs from 1955 and identifies the central aim of the PRC's grand strategy as the desire to become a global power. He gives an in depth discussion on China's political warfare operations in Nigeria. He lists a myriad of humanitarian activities undertaken in Nigeria by the PRC which eventually led to the PRC acquiring numerous infrastructure agreements as well as oil exploration deals in

Nigeria. These activities also led to Nigeria's acquisition of military hardware and military exchange programs between the two countries.

Summary

This chapter has examined some of the literature relating to US and Chinese interaction with Africa. The chapter looked at issues pointing to the view that both countries are in a kind of "Cold War" competition and are thus not likely to work together in Africa. The chapter also established that African states are still susceptible to superpower intervention and further looked at how the two powers are currently relating to African states.

Though not specifically cited, numerous articles in many journals, mainly available on the internet, were reviewed. These include articles produced in Council on Foreign Relations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, China Quarterly, Beijing Review, The Institute for International Studies, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Power and Interest News Report.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter will outline the research design method utilized in the conduct of this study. The methodology adopted is the qualitative analysis method within which a comparative case study approach will be used. A comparative case study approach examines two or more cases, focusing on differences and similarities (Lowe, 2006). The work will also be reinforced with some quantitative data to establish the changes that have developed in US/China relations with Africa.

Methodology

In using the qualitative analysis method, a researcher studies a problem by collecting data from a variety of sources including primary and secondary materials. The researcher then analyzes the materials to determine the significance of the information to the problem that is being studied. After an analysis and interpretation of the collected data, the researcher attempts to develop a broader conclusion as the information is evaluated in a wider context of the problem. The qualitative methodological format used in this work comprises six steps: identification and isolation of the problem, development of a hypothesis, collection and classification of source materials, organization of facts into results, formation of conclusions, and synthesis and presentation in an organized form (Evers 2003, 24).

Step One: Identification and Isolation of the Problem

In recent times Africa has assumed greater importance in the international community, especially in the eyes of the US and China, for reasons other than conflict and crisis. The US and China, who happen to be the first and second leading consumers of oil in the world, have increased their forays into Africa and are likely to devise strategies to secure and expand their interests, especially the quest for African resources. African states, by their underdevelopment status and weak institutional framework, are still susceptible to foreign intervention. The mechanics of the Cold War are thus likely to be replicated by China and the US, only this time the superpowers are not formed on ideological lines, but rather on economic lines. There is concern that the ways through which the US and China are pursuing their policies in Africa have the likelihood of leading to the eruption or exacerbation of intrastate conflicts on the continent.

Step Two: Development of a Hypothesis

Whereas the US tries to tie some conditionalities in its interaction with developing countries, the PRC has turned a blind eye to human right abuses that exist in some of its partner states. Also, much of the economic activities between the US and Africa is spearheaded by private firms whereas, in the case of China, the government is the lead agency. Looking at these basic differences in the way the two powers will interact with African states in their quest for resources, this paper will attempt to establish that there could be clashes of interests between the two powers. These clashes of interests could result in increased incidence of conflict and instability in Africa. Although there is a school of thought that some superpowers tend to benefit from instability in developing countries, it is prudent to mention that it is in the interest of the two powers to ensure that

there is stability in Africa to protect their interests. However, as it was in the case of the Cold War, the perceived stability may be compressing underlying tensions which may erupt to its full extent when the superpowers leave. This paper therefore posits that the ways the US and China are pursuing their interests in Africa could lead to greater instability on the continent. This hypothesis is reinforced by the belief that the two powers will eventually leave Africa and will not have the need to invest so much resource and time into the continent. The view that any of the superpowers who eventually emerges as the only hegemon in future, will have the morale obligation of not turning entirely away from Africa is beyond the scope of this paper and could be open for another study.

Step Three: Collection and Classification of Source Materials

Information collected in pursuant of this study could be classified into the following categories:

1. A historical look at US-China relations which will emphasize the suspicion with which the countries regard each other in order to establish that the two countries are in a kind of “Cold War” competition which will affect how they conduct themselves in Africa.
2. The second category of materials collected will focus on Cold War intervention of superpowers in Africa and will seek to establish that Africa is still prone to superpower intervention. This aspect of the work is necessary to set conditions for making a comparison between Cold War competition between the US and the USSR with the current competition for African resources between the US and China.

3. The last category highlights both the US and China's relations with Africa and will focus on current interactions by the two powers, particularly with regards to Nigeria and Sudan. This category will include some amount of statistical evidence to show that both powers have increased interests in Africa.

Step Four: Organization of the Facts into Results

The material collected will be utilized in presenting a four-part analysis of the US and PRC increased interest in Africa as follows:

1. A presentation of data to indicate that both powers have increased interests in Africa.
2. The second part will describe how the two powers are pursuing their policies in Nigeria and Sudan, while attempting to identify any clashes of interests.
3. The third part will then proceed to compare any identified clashes to Cold War scenarios, highlighting any differences and similarities.
4. The final part will analyze how the competition between the two superpowers is affecting the African continent.

Step Five: Formation of Conclusions

Based on the analysis completed in step four, this step will arrive at conclusions as to whether the situation presented will actually lead to instability or will rather lead to stability on the African continent. These conclusions drawn may also drive any recommendations that may flow out of the analysis.

Step Six: Synthesis and Presentation

In this research methodology, five chapters will be presented with each chapter covering a pertinent portion of analytical research. The chapter arrangement is as follows:

Chapter 1 outlines the problem and gives the background to the research.

Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent literature available on the subject matter.

Chapter 3 identifies the research methodology used in the thesis.

Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the collected material to identify whether the US and PRC increased interaction with Africa will promote chaos or stability.

Chapter 5 outlines conclusions drawn from the research work and will include recommendations for further study.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter will present an analysis of the material and information available in order to form a good basis for making conclusions and recommendations. The analysis will be done in four parts as outlined below:

Part I will comprise an analysis of data available, through the DIME instruments of national power, to indicate that both powers have increased their interests in Africa.

Part II will be an analysis of how the US and China are pursuing their policies in Nigeria and Sudan, while attempting to identify any clashes in the ways and means being employed.

Part III will compare any identified clashes to Cold War scenarios, highlighting any differences and similarities.

Part IV will look at how the competition for superpower interests in Africa is likely to impact on stability on the continent.

Part I

Analysis of Data Relating to Increased Superpower Interest in Africa

The US has for decades been the world's leading consumer of petroleum products. In 2004, China became the world's second-largest consumer of petroleum products, displacing Japan to third place. It is projected that by 2015, China will surpass the US as the largest global consumer of oil, although its domestic oil production is likely to continue diminishing (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006). According to the US Energy

Information Administration (EIA), the US consumed an average of about 20.6 million bpd of oil during the first nine months of 2005, the same amount year-over-year as in 2004. China, on the other hand, consumed a little over 7million bpd of oil in 2005, which represents an increase of almost 1million bpd over the 2004 consumption figures. Based on the comparative rates of consumption, Eisenman and Kurlantzick project that China will surpass the US as the world's leading consumer of oil by 2015. This assertion can be reinforced by Maj NG Chad-Song's forecast that, based on the comparative GDP growth rate of China projected to be 6.5 percent and that of the US being 3 percent, China's economy will begin to eclipse that of the US and other states in the 2020-2030 timeframe (Chad-Song 2005, 2). Such a rate of growth will require an increased consumption of and demand for oil.

According to Esther Pan, China's booming economy, which has averaged 9 percent growth per year for the last two decades, requires massive levels of natural resources to sustain its growth. She projects that by 2045, China will depend on imported oil for 45 percent of its energy needs requiring the country to lock in supplies from relatively low-cost African or Middle Eastern sources. She is, however, quick to point out that after the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US and the subsequent upheaval throughout the Middle East, China is actively diversifying its supply lines away from the Middle East (Pan 2006). It is worth pointing out that China depends on other sources of energy including coal and hydro power.

Table 1 shows the relationship between domestic oil production and consumption levels for China and the US from 2004-2006. It is obvious that in the case of China, consumption levels continue to rise, however, domestic oil production does not match the

rise in consumption. The US also consumes far more than it is able to produce domestically.

Table 1. China and US Oil Production and Consumption from 2004-2006						
Country	Production ('000 bpd)			Consumption ('000 bpd)		
	2004	2005	2006	2004	2005	2006
China	3,635	3,759	3,836	6,400	6,823	7,274
USA	8,700	8,322	8,367	20,731	20,802	20,588

Source: Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual (2000-2004), International Petroleum Monthly (2005-2006)

Both countries have thus had to rely increasingly on external sources to make up for the difference between consumption and domestic oil production as this gap becomes wider with time. In 2005 China consumed 6.82 million bpd while it only produced 3.76 million bpd. The Energy Information administration projects that by 2025, China's oil demand will reach 14.2 million bpd with net import figures of 10.9 million bpd (Hurst 2006, 3).

With the growing concern for security in the Middle East, coupled with the fact that consumption of petroleum products by the two powers continue to increase, African sources of oil seem to be the obvious choice for the two countries to fall on to satisfy their insatiable thirst for oil. Although other natural resources from Africa are also desired, especially by China, to galvanize its industrial expansion, oil seems to be the most contentious, and has thus drawn much attention. It is worth highlighting that China's imports of natural gas, copper, cobalt, and other key resources are also rising by as much as 20 percent annually (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006).

China's Increased Interest in Africa

Sino-Africa relations are not new, but rather date back to early fifteenth century when expeditions by Chinese reached Africa's Swahili coast. In the 1950s and 1960s, with many African nations gaining independence from their colonial masters, China identified itself with the emerging African nations as part of a developing world alliance seeking political equality and economic control of their own fate. Together, they could wrestle themselves out of a situation where their political and economic destiny had been shaped largely by the interest of Western nations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Thus, driven by perceived ideological and anti-imperialist affinities, the PRC dispatched Chinese technicians to nominally leftist states to provide military training, modest economic aid and infrastructural monuments to socialist solidarity. In the 1960s and 1970s, the PRC gave aid to socialist nations to build stadiums, hospitals, railroads and other infrastructure. For instance, the PRC was the principal donor in the construction of the Tanzam railway, running from Tanzania to Zambia (Magyar 1999, 113).

Relationships were further strengthened with a steady flow of Chinese teachers, doctors and expert engineers into the African states. The Chinese were known to have been very active in several African liberation wars including those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In dealing with Africa, China developed a policy that was aimed both at maximizing its influence (and counterbalancing the USSR's after the Sino-Soviet split) and at isolating Taiwan on the world stage. China used its aid and support for African governments to solicit their non-recognition of Taiwan.

This interest however receded in the 1980s as Chinese development efforts were focused inwards. In this period, Beijing became preoccupied with building socialism with

Chinese characteristics back home and thus committed little of its resources into Africa (Mooney 2005). Actually, up till about 1996, China's influence in Africa was limited and its aid programs were hardly significant (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006).

China has experienced rapid economic growth since the late 1990s. In the context of this economic success, Africa has seen a growing Chinese presence focused mainly towards economic engagement. The main elements of the Chinese presence in Africa appear to be the following:

1. Expanding access to raw materials, especially oil and other natural resources
2. Finding new markets for Chinese goods
3. Maximizing the number of African nations that maintain official relations with the PRC, rather than Taiwan which is still recognized by seven African governments (Burkina Faso, Chad, The Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Swaziland)
4. Demonstrating its emergence as a major power, especially in the United Nations and other international organizations (U.S. Congress, Senate 2005, 19)

The increasing Chinese interest in Africa is manifest in various forms and can be looked at in terms of the four instruments of national power, i.e. Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME).

Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

The increased presence of China is reflected by the sudden rise in the number of official visits to the continent by Chinese officials and businessmen within the 2002-2004 timeframe. According to Phillip C. Saunders, foreign travel by the Chinese President and Premier, the two top leaders in the PRC, tends to draw their time and energy away from other important matters. These visits therefore imply a significant resource commitment

and are thus accompanied by extensive preparations and diplomatic advance work to maximize the returns on such visits (Saunders 2006, 19). Based on the total number of days spent by the Chinese President and Premier in their visits to various regions in 1993, 1998, 2002, 2003, and 2004, Saunders makes the following significant deductions:

1. Between 2002 and 2004, Chinese leadership visits emphasized countries with energy or other natural resources. Excluding visits to the US and Europe, 65 percent of the countries visited by the leaders were oil and/or natural gas producers with 72 percent being exporters of energy or another significant natural resource (Saunders 2006, 20).

2. Although the data for 1993 was very low due to Premier Li Peng's inability to travel because of ill-health, it is very obvious that in 1993, Africa's significance to China was very minimal and thus the two leaders did not devote their energies in trying to relate with Africa. This attitude however changed with the increase in the economic development that generated the desire for Africa's raw materials. As a matter of policy, the first visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister every year is to Africa, showing the importance the PRC now attaches to its relations with Africa (Saunders 2006, 20).

The importance of Africa to China in the Hu Jintao administration is also indicative from the fact that of the four countries President Hu Jintao visited immediately following the Hu-Bush summit in April 2006 (Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Kenya), three were African (Tang 2006, 14). The PRC's declaration of 2006 as China's "Year of Africa" was very successful and between January and November 2006, President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing all traveled to Africa, visiting a total of 15 countries (Economy 2006). Also, during a trip to Africa in early 2006, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of China's legislature, spent four days in Zimbabwe

leading a delegation of 100 Chinese businessmen who signed joint venture deals in mining, transportation, communications, and power generation. The PRC has also played host to several visiting government and business officials from Africa in the same time frame (Mooney 2005).

The exchange of high powered government official visits as well as the increased travel by business officials from China to Africa has tended to foster the relationship between China and Africa with many African states becoming more and more dependent on China as an alternate source of aid and developmental assistance. Emmerson Mnangagwa, the Zimbabwean speaker of parliament, stated in a local state-run newspaper after Wu Bangguo's visit to Zimbabwe that: "With all-weather friends like the People's Republic of China . . . Zimbabwe will never walk alone" (Roughneen 2006, 3).

The significant issue that arises from the visits by the Chinese political and business elite is that they focus on the countries that the PRC wants to engage irrespective of whether or not the rest of the international community are making efforts to isolate a particular country or not. China has persistently indicated that it does not want to interfere in issues that it considers as the internal matters of a sovereign state. China adheres to its "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," and thus claims to respect African countries' choice in political systems and development paths suited to their own peculiar conditions without having to interfere (China.org.cn 2003). In pursuing this policy, it has turned a blind eye to the international outcry on human rights abuses in countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe, and continues to engage such states. Another point of worry is the fact that China still practices one-party rule and media censorship (Roughneen 2006, 2). There is the fear that with the increased interaction with China,

many African states may back-pedal on commitments made to promote good governance and accountability. Such commitments to good governance are enshrined in programs like the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), to which all the African states are signatories. Greater dependence on China by African states will also free the governments from good governance conditionalities associated with World Bank and western aid and developmental programs.

Informational Instrument of National Power

To improve on China's image, the PRC undertakes programs to build grassroots support in local African communities. Although such programs are not new in Africa, more opportunities are being offered for African students to enroll in Chinese universities. This is especially significant in the context of the tightening of immigration laws in the West as a result of recent security threats. The PRC increasingly provides scholarships for African students to study in China where typically they spend about two years learning Chinese before studying mainly technical subjects like engineering.

Chinese culture and practices are also becoming more pronounced on the African continent with the increased interest in the continent by the PRC. Chinese culture is increasingly being exposed to Africans through various ways. There have been a series of Chinese art and cultural exhibitions across the continent. In January 2006, there was an exhibition of pictures of Beijing and the art of Weifang Kites from the PRC, in Ethiopia, which attracted quite a significant audience including high level government officials. In 2000, performers from the Tianjin Acrobatic Troupe of China, acting as envoys of Chinese culture, thrilled Kenyan audiences to two weeks of exquisite acrobatic performances that endeared them to many Kenyans. In May 2001, China Central

Television (CCTV), the Chinese national television station, agreed to authorize the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) to use programs from a couple of CCTV's channels for international services (Chau 2007, 28). The Kenyan Minister for Information, Transport and Communication is said to have remarked that this broadcasting cooperation enabled Kenyans to have more news sources instead of concentrating on western media. Xinhua News Agency donated equipment, including computers, printers and a fax machine, to the Kenya News Agency in July 2001 as a way of fostering good relationship between the two agencies. In January 2006, China Radio International (CRI), Beijing's only radio service that operates overseas, launched an FM radio station, known as "Africa Express" in Nairobi, Kenya. The radio station started providing 19 hours of CRI programs a day in English, Swahili, and Chinese to the residents of Nairobi (Chau 2007, 29). Whilst promoting China through radio broadcasts in many parts of Africa, China is known to have provided a radio jamming device to Zimbabwe that enables the government to block broadcasts of independent news sources (Pan 2006).

China has been quite effective in winning the "hearts and minds" of many Africans, both at the governmental and the grassroots level. In Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian government has commissioned and named a 2.2 kilometer road as "Ethio-China Friendship Avenue" to reflect the ever-growing bonds of friendship between China and Ethiopia (Chau 2007, 25).

Military Instrument of National Power

The Congressional Research Service reports that China's arms sales to Africa made up 10 percent of all conventional arms transfers to the continent between 1996 and

2003 (Pan 2006). China also provides military training and Chinese specialists in heavy military equipment to many African states. China's arms industry sold fighter jets and military transport trucks to the cash-strapped government in Zimbabwe, helicopters to Angola and Mali and light arms to Namibia and Sierra Leone, just to name a few (Alden 2005, 151-152). Interestingly, rather than taking sides in a conflict, China prefers to deal with both sides in a conflict on a strictly business basis. Before and during the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, China sold an estimated \$1 billion worth of weapons to both sides (Pan 2006).

The Chinese military has also increased its presence in Africa by contributing troops for peacekeeping missions on the continent. When Liberia denounced recognition of Taiwan, the PRC sent 600 peacekeepers to the country and has also sent peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as well as other UN missions on the continent. This affords the Chinese military personnel the opportunity to interact with and get closer to military personnel of the African states also serving in such missions. It has the effect of creating a better bond among the militaries. Eventually, many of the Africans tend to see the Chinese not as superpowers who try to solve African problems from a distance, but rather as partners in the solution process. This mindset, according to many analysts, is what the Chinese want to establish on the African continent where their relationship was built on the historical precedence of Africa and China having both suffered under imperialism. This may have the eventual effect of making China more attractive to Africans *vis-à-vis* western competitors in Africa, especially the US.

Economic Instrument of National Power

China continues to provide aid to Africa as part of a long history that is aimed at building goodwill and political support. Chinese assistance to African countries includes grants as well as low and no-interest loans. China has also undertaken huge debt forgiveness schemes in Africa. This notwithstanding, China's recent interaction with Africa has been characterized by increased trade and economic activity. Sino-African trade grew by 700 percent during the 1990s. From 2002 to 2003, trade between China and Africa doubled to \$18.5 billion, and continued its increase with a 39 percent leap to \$32.17 billion in the first ten months of 2005. Most of the growth could be attributed to the increased Chinese imports of oil from Sudan and other African nations (Pan 2006).

China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa represented \$900 million of the continent's \$15 billion total in 2004 with China now assuming the position as Africa's third most-important trading partner, behind the United States and France, and ahead of Britain (Pan 2006). Figure 1 represents official Chinese data on outbound FDI to Africa which shows an increase from \$28 million to \$428.9 million, an increase by over 1,431 percent over a ten-year period from 1994 to 2004.

The FDI data in figure 1 represents only official data which captures investments that go through formal government approval processes. It excludes a significant amount of FDI financed by retained foreign earnings as well as funds raised through foreign capital markets. There are other investments too that may be approved by the Chinese government but may not necessarily pass through the established process (Saunders 2006, 21).




Figure 1. FDI from China to Africa from 1993 to 2004

Source: Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 2006), 42.

To encourage trade relations between China and Africa, the Chinese government has been sponsoring the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CAFC) which is aimed at providing opportunities for governments and businesses to strengthen economic cooperation. In 2000, when the first forum was organized, two-way trade between China and Africa surpassed US\$10 billion for the first time in history and by the time of the 2004 CACF, 674 Chinese companies were operating in Africa. Two hundred and fifty African businessmen and 150 from China attended the CACF held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003, which was also attended by Chinese Premier Wen Jibao and the then UN secretary General Kofi Annan (Thompson 2004).

Trade between Africa and China, as a percentage of China's total trade, has increased significantly in the 2003-2004 time frame as shown in table 2. Although

China's total imports fell by almost 4 points, representing a 9 percent decrease, imports from Africa rose by over 33 points (61 percent) mainly as a result of Chinese demand for energy, natural resources, and commodity surges (Saunders 2006, 23). Exports to Africa increased by almost 162 percent over the same timeframe from 13.6 percent to 35.6 percent of China's total exports.

Table 2. Chinese Export and Import Growth in Percentages for 2003 and 2004				
	Imports		Exports	
	2003	2004	2003	2004
World	38.4	34.8	33.8	35.4
Africa	54.0	87.2	13.6	35.6
Australia	24.8	58.3	36.6	41.1
Latin America	78.7	45.9	24.3	55.0
Middle East	53.2	48.6	43.6	28.3

Source: Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 2006), 23.

Exports to African markets have mainly been in low-cost consumer goods which have been identified as having a stifling effect on local African industries. In some instances, the Chinese trade incursions have led to tensions and unrest especially among the labor force employed in local industries. For example, “[In] South Africa where an estimated one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Chinese dominate the retail and wholesale clothing industry, unions have pressed Pretoria to put quotas on Chinese apparel and textile imports to protect local industry and jobs” (Economy 2006). Facing competition from the Chinese in recent times, only 20 local textile factories remain out of

250 that were operational 20 years ago in Zambia (Marks 2006). The fact that most African countries lack the institutional capacity to prevent or control the invasion of their markets by cheap, and sometimes inferior, products is of great concern to many analysts as well as African producers and merchants. The situation has been worsened by the expiration on 1 January 2005 of the Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The PRC also continues to provide technical aid to Africa as part of its effort to increase China's influence in Africa. At the end of 2003, as many as 940 Chinese doctors were working throughout the continent (Thompson 2004). The PRC seems to prefer giving technical support to African states as compared with giving out financial aid. The main reason behind this trend is the fact that China itself requires huge financial resources for developing China and leans towards investments that have a chance of yielding returns. Many African states have also come to realize that aid and debt forgiveness, *per se*, are not the panaceas to their many economic problems. The NEPAD initiative places more emphasis on trade rather than aid. In this vein therefore, China and many African states tend to find common ground to increase their interaction. Another idea behind China's preference for technical aid is to promote the Chinese brand of economic development and reforms. They therefore encourage government officials to visit China and learn from their experience.

United States of America's Increased Interest in Africa

Africa has assumed a new, strategic place in US foreign policy and in the definition of vital US national interests. This shift moves the United States away from the past habit of treating Africa as a humanitarian afterthought and begins to reverse a decade-long

decline in the United States' presence and engagement in Africa.
(2004, 2)

Kansteiner, *Rising US Stakes in Africa*

The US had traditionally seen Africa as less of a priority due to a “lingering Euro-centered colonial view which perceived Africa as an extension of the European sphere of interest” (Skinner 1986, 5). In the 1960s however, when many African states became independent, the US recognized the need to get these numerous states in its camp in order to deny them to the Soviets as its Cold War competitor. The US put emphasis on the need for African states to adopt economic structures, policies and practices similar to those of the US. This apparently proved to be very expensive for the US such that without a credible opponent seeking to exert controls over the continent from 1989, the US left Africa to its own devices in the painful pursuit of domestic political consolidation and legitimacy (Magyar 1999, 13).

According to J. Stephen Morrison and Jennifer G. Cooke, the years of Bill Clinton's presidency saw unprecedented high-level engagement in Africa. The Clinton administration emphasized two key areas in its relations with Africa to include global market integration, through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and investment in security through the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). These programs, as well as a series of others put forth in the Clinton administration, became unduly complex and difficult to execute and sustain due to a worsening environment within Africa and indecisiveness within the US policy making processes (Morrison and Cooke 2001, 1-2).

“Interest in the continent of Africa seemingly increases or decreases with the change in the United States' political administration” (Cumbo 2003, 1). With the

Republicans taking over the political reins of the US in 2001, it was highly anticipated that the Clinton administration's increased interest in Africa would be shirked. This was in view of President Bush's statement that "Africa didn't fit into national strategic interests" during a presidential campaign (Cumbo 2003, 12). This position however changed as events unfolded after the Bush administration assumed power, primarily as a direct result of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US. The US became more interested in African affairs. Because of this increased interest, US engagement and presence on the continent increased because, according to J Stephen Morrison:

[The] events of 11 September 2001 changed the overall strategic US conception of global security and forced a rethinking of how Africa fits, taking account of its special humanitarian, security, and developmental needs. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, issued by the president in September 2002, formally argued, in dramatic, unequivocal terms, that Africa had become vitally significant in the quest to combat transnational terror networks and their state sponsors. It made the case, on both moral and security grounds, that a special concerted effort had to be made to save and improve the lives of persons threatened by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

Perhaps less obvious, only after September 11 did the United States begin, retrospectively, to appreciate fully how five factors over the previous decade have steadily elevated the significance of Africa to U.S. national interests and, implicitly, stirred a historic challenge to the United States to respond in new, innovative ways. These drivers include HIV/AIDS, terror, oil, armed conflicts, and global trade. (Kansteiner 2004, 2)

In a testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 2 April 2003, William M. Bellamy, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that the five overriding goals in Africa are to: promote economic growth through support for market reforms and the private sector; help resolve conflicts that are blocking economic and political development; foster democratic reforms, good governance, and respect for human rights; combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other infectious diseases;

and protect Africa's natural environment and renewable resources (U.S. Department of State 2003).

In the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006, Africa is presented as holding a growing geo-strategic importance and being high priority of the Bush Administration. "The United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies" (U.S. President 2006, 37).

Despite all these pronouncements, there is widespread belief among many Africans that the US focus is more on economic and security issues centering on natural resources like oil, and the fight against terrorism. Good governance, eradication of the HIVAIDS pandemic and other areas of concern are just necessary precursors to achieving the economic and security ends. There is thus a lot of skepticism in how the African populace looks at the increased foray in Africa by the US. The increased interest will be analyzed using the DIME instruments of national power.

Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

The US continues to recognize the fact that the sheer numbers that African countries hold at international forums, like the UN and the WTO, makes continued diplomatic relations with Africa key to pushing ahead the US' agenda in such organizations. Diplomatic efforts on the continent have included exchange of visits at the highest political and business levels as well as active involvement in peace processes on the continent. According to a White House publication, during his first two years in office, President Bush met with 25 African Heads of State (touted as the greatest level of engagement of all administrations) and directed his cabinet secretaries to have high level

engagements in Africa. The president paid visits to five African countries (Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda and Nigeria) from 7-12 July 2003 (The White House n.d.). His entourage included a large contingent of US businessmen. The focus of this visit thus seems to have centered around regional conflict resolution, trade and HIV/AIDS issues on the continent.

Significantly, countries that have been seen as repressive and promoting bad governance have been sidelined in these diplomatic efforts. Zimbabwe, for instance, has come under persistent pressure from the US and other Western states for its human right abuses. It is interesting to note that when President Obasanjo of Nigeria was encouraging attempts to amend the nation's constitution to enable him stand for another term of office, as well as his persecution of opposition figures in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria, the US was not as vocal in its criticism as would have been expected. Such issues tend to incense the skepticism with which many Africans view relations with the US as seeking to promote what the US only sees as being right irrespective of the effect it may have on the African states and their people.

To assist in controlling one of the major setbacks to development in Africa, the US has increased its efforts in combating the HIV/AIDS menace as well as control of other diseases. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is an unprecedented, 5-year, \$15 billion effort. The 2006 NSS, building on the success of pioneering programs in Africa, spelt out the launching of a major initiative that will prevent 7 million new infections, provide treatment to 2 million infected individuals, and care for 10 million AIDS orphans and others affected by the disease. A \$1.2 billion, 5-year initiative to reduce malaria deaths by 50 percent in at least 15 targeted countries, has also been

launched (U.S. President 2006, 31). Many of these programs are quite visible at the grassroots level in the African states and the presence of US-based NGOs and other governmental organizations, like the PEACE CORPS, among the populace tends to foster better relationship between the Africans and the US.

Informational Instrument of National Power

The US is increasing its drive for many African states to shift to Western style democracy which is founded on good governance and the rule of law. In his testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 2 April 2003, William M. Bellamy pointed out thus:

Good governance, observance of the rule of law, respect for human rights, and democratization are factors that mitigate against civil strife and violent conflict. They are also essential to economic development. Much of the \$77 million in the President's budget request in FY 2004 for Economic Support Funds (ESF) for Africa will go to promote free and fair elections and the rule of law, and to strengthen civil societies, human rights organizations, and independent media. One of the most stirring successes in Africa last year was the Kenyan election that brought a peaceful transition at the conclusion of President Moi's 24-year rule. Following this historic event, it is important that we do everything possible to help the new Kenyan government succeed, including its promise to vigorously combat corruption. (U.S. Congress, Senate 2003)

It is significant to note that in an effort to assist governments that have received a check in the box by the US as promoting democracy, there is the likelihood of eventually assisting to isolate other key actors in the country. This is because the institutions in the African society are still not developed for the kind of democracy that is practiced by the west. There is still a lot of vindictiveness and prejudice in the interaction between governments in power and opposition elements in many African states. Under the guise of anti-corruption campaigns, governments in power use various means to suppress opposition elements as was depicted in the run up to the 2007 presidential elections in

Nigeria. The US, may become drawn into this unhealthy practice in an attempt to help some African governments combat corruption or promote political reforms.

A strategic objective of the US Department of State is to promote international understanding through public diplomacy and public affairs. This is aimed at increasing international understanding for American values, policies, and initiatives to create a receptive international environment (U.S. Department of State and U.S.A.I.D 2003). This is very essential as it is becoming common for the average people, especially in the developing countries of Africa, to misconstrue American policies on the continent. The Voice of America (VOA) continues its radio and television broadcast to many African countries, in the light of competition from many other international networks.

Military Instrument of National Power

The US National Defense Strategy of March 2005 acknowledges that uncertainty is the defining characteristic of today's strategic environment. It draws on a quote from the 2002 National Security Strategy that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." With the African continent plagued by numerous intra-state conflicts, the fear of terrorist networks setting up camp in some of the ungoverned spaces became of much concern to security analysts. The Defense Strategy aims at disrupting and attacking terrorist networks by: "Preventing the exploitation by terrorist organizations of large, ungoverned spaces and borders; and improving the military counterterrorism capabilities of allies and partners" (U.S. Department of Defense 2005).

A significant military program aimed at combating terrorism is the EUCOM-directed Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), formerly known as the Pan

Sahel Initiative. The idea behind this program is to train local armies and share information in the Pentagon's new "netwar" strategy, which seeks to fight terrorism by mimicking the fluid, discreet structure of the terrorist organizations. In 2006, the TSCTI budget was \$30 million with a mandate to deploy in Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia (Morris 2006, 229). Critics of the scheme have argued that the Sahel and Sahara Desert region is too wide an area for any impact to be made if indeed the terrorist organizations intend using the region as a safe haven. A former ambassador to Mali, Robert Pringle is quoted to have said that the whole terrorism thing is being exaggerated, thus downplaying the importance of the TSCTI. Another State Department official is also said to have described the TSCTI as "a hammer looking for a nail" (Morris 2006, 229). It is however worth mentioning that with the nature of terrorism, security agencies cannot afford to be reactionary. The "hammer" has to look for "nails" to hit if catastrophes with magnitudes similar to the 9/11 attacks are to be prevented.

The immense potential of the Gulf of Guinea (both in terms of its resource endowment and strategic importance as a shipping route/hub) has drawn domestic and international attention to the urgent need for focused action to address existing and potential challenges (Giplin 2007). The US has also identified this strategically important sector and has put in efforts to be part of the solution to the problems in the region. The significance of the African continent to the US is manifest in the creation, in February 2007, of a new Unified Command for Africa which hitherto fell under the jurisdiction of the US European Command with Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia assigned to US Central Command.

In March 2006, the US European Command, US Naval Forces in Europe, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies organized an experts' workshop on maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. This workshop, organized in Accra, Ghana, analyzed the broad range of maritime safety and security threats facing countries in the Gulf of Guinea and identified the multifaceted implications of continued instability in this region's territorial waters. The conference was also aimed at evaluating the roles of domestic, regional and non-regional entities in exacerbating or abating maritime threats and vulnerabilities. Finally, it outlined the key elements of a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable strategy for effective maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea and highlighted practical steps that Gulf of Guinea states could take to individually and collectively adopt and successfully implement such a strategy over time (Giplin 2007).

As a follow up, the US European Command, US Naval Forces Europe, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and the US Department of State co-sponsored a three-day ministerial-level conference in Cotonou, Benin in November 2006. The *Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Conference* had a goal of adopting a practical, comprehensive and sustainable strategy to address maritime safety and security challenges. The communiqué and Plan of Action adopted at the end of the conference included the importance of taking practical steps to improve surveillance and information sharing, the need for robust and appropriate laws and regulatory regimes, and the value of enhanced regional cooperation and policy harmonization. Other highlights were the facilitating role of increased public awareness of the scope and effects of maritime insecurity, the supportive role of bilateral, multilateral, non-governmental and commercial partners, as well as the necessity of unwavering political will by leaders in

the sub-region (Giplin 2007). Like many of such conferences, one wonders if this is not just a forum for expressing good ideas that never get fully implemented. Most of the governments in Africa lack the political will and the wherewithal to implement policies that do not have immediate visible economic benefits that the public will hail.

To help in conflict resolution on the continent, the US continues to assist in the training and provision of logistic support to African troops embarking on peacekeeping operations. The ACOTA program enjoys perhaps the highest profile of all US-Africa military assistance arrangements. With an annual budget of \$15 million, ACOTA has trained over 17,000 African troops from 10 countries (Shanahan and Francis 2005). Other significant military programs ongoing with Africa include bilateral security assistance programs. Prominent among these are the International Military Exchange Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs that involve the training of African military personnel in US institutions as well as the purchase of US military equipment. Periodic combined exercises are also held across Africa which include the West African Training Cruise (WATC) led by the US Navy and the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program conducted with the US Special Forces in specific countries. However, due to the irregular nature of some of these exercises, the impact is not very much felt in the host nations. The exercises, which are usually intended to train the trainers, are usually not followed up due to the lack of local capacity to conduct further training.

Economic Instrument of National Power

Although the US is using the economic instrument of national power extensively in Africa, the two major policy initiatives that readily come to mind are the African AGOA and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). According to the 2006 NSS, the

US continues to promote the opportunities of increased trade to sub-Saharan Africa through the AGOA, and extended the opportunity to many other developing countries through the Generalized System of Preferences. The NSS goes on to further state that the US is pursuing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) scheme with the countries of the Southern African Customs Union, which are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland (U.S. President 2006, 26).

AGOA grants duty-free access to most goods from countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The US Government intends that the largest possible number of these African countries are able to take advantage of AGOA. President Clinton issued a proclamation on October 2, 2000 designating 34 countries in sub-Saharan Africa as eligible for the AGOA trade benefits. The aim of the US Government is to work with eligible countries to sustain their efforts to institute policy reforms, and with the remaining sub-Saharan African countries to help them achieve eligibility. To be eligible for AGOA, countries need to

have established, or are making continual progress toward establishing the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices. (U.S. Congress 2000)

Unfortunately, many small scale businesses who are supposed to be the target for the AGOA program lack the financial base to expand production to compete in the US market.

The Bush administration established a change in development strategy with the MCA program, which is targeted at rewarding countries that govern justly, invest in their

people, and foster economic freedom. The MCA is based on the principle that each nation bears the responsibility for its own development. It offers African governments the opportunity and the means to undertake transformational change by designing their own reform and development programs, which are then funded through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC has approved over \$1.5 billion for compacts in eight countries, is working with over a dozen other countries on compacts, and has committed many smaller grants to other partner countries (U.S. President 2006). The issue with the MCA is that the standards expected of the receiving states are so stringent that very few countries have been able to access it. The US Congress also has been noted to be dragging its feet in appropriating much of the funds for the program.

Economic interaction between the US and Africa as in any international relationship is a two-way street. The US is increasingly turning to Africa for its oil which is said to be generally “sweet” (high quality and low in sulfur), making African oil very suitable for products that require stringent refinement. It is estimated that the US gets about 18 percent of its oil from Sub-Saharan Africa (Morris 2006, 226).

According to the National Intelligence Council, oil imports from African sources are expected to rise to 25 percent of US total oil imports by 2015. Among the top ten oil suppliers to the US who supply a total of 8,733,000 bpd, Nigeria and Angola place fifth and seventh respectively, supplying a total of 1,373,000 bpd (Goldwyn 2005). With such developing trends, it stands to reason that the US cannot afford to continue treating Africa as a backbencher in its international relations.

Summary of Analysis of Increased US and Chinese Interest in Africa

Although there are other reasons why both the US and China have increased their interests in Africa, it will be safe to posit that the need for resources, particularly oil, is the main driver of the increased foray into Africa. The ways and means of gaining access to the African oil however differ as expressed by Princeton N. Lyman, former US Ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria, when he said: “The Chinese can combine bids on oil resources with aid programs and building of infrastructure in one package. We don’t compete that way. Our oil companies are private over here” (Panel Discussion by Council on Foreign Relations on “More than Humanitarianism: a Strategic Report to Africa, 23 January 2006). Most Africans see the Chinese foray as a quicker means of achieving development since, apart from conditionalities attached to US support, the US tends to engage in a lot of conferences that do not produce visible results to the populace. Sierra Leone’s Ambassador to Beijing, Sahr Johnny summed up the feelings of many Africans when he stated that “...If a G8 country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, we’d be holding meetings! The Chinese just come and do it ... Chinese investment is succeeding because they don’t set high benchmarks” (Hilsum 2006).

The establishment of the US African Command in February 2007 is also reflective of the increasing importance of Africa to the US. Defense Secretary Robert Gates indicated to the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 February 2007, that the new command will “oversee security, cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to nonmilitary missions, and if directed, military operations on the African continent.” The Command is however still in its formative stages and thus its impact on the continent cannot be assessed at this time.

Part II

How the Two Powers Are Pursuing their Interests in Africa

Strategy, as discussed previously in Chapter 1, is all about ends, ways, and means. One of the key strategic ends for the two powers, in their strategies towards Africa, is securing access to African resources. The ways being adopted to achieve the ends will be the focus of this section, using Nigeria and Sudan as case studies. The goal is to estimate what impact this increased competition may have upon the stability of these two nations.

Nigeria as a Case Study

Nigeria, in 2004, was the leading oil producer in Africa, producing 2.5 million bpd and counted as the eighth in world exports of oil (Goldwyn 2005). Nigeria is also ranked as one of the most corrupt countries on Earth (Morris 2006, 229) but has drawn significant attention from both China and the US. The two superpowers employ all the DIME instruments of national power to promote their interests in Nigeria.

Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

Diplomatic relations between China and Nigeria have been quite steady since relations were established in 1971. Relations have been characterized in recent times by high level government visits by both countries. President Olusegun Obasanjo visited the PRC in 1999 after Premier Li Peng's visit in 1997. President Hu Jintao also visited Nigeria in 2004.

Unlike the Cold War era where alignment with one competitor meant severing ties with the other superpower, Nigeria continues to enjoy good diplomatic relations with the US, identified as the major competitor for the Chinese foray into Africa. President

Bush visited Nigeria in July 2003 and President Obasanjo is known to have visited the White House in October 1999, December 2004 and in March 2006. Talks during such visits usually center on developmental issues of mutual benefit to the countries and in the case of the US, sometimes on matters bordering on regional security.

Informational Instrument of National Power

PRC operations are diverse and aimed at influencing the people and government of Nigeria, particularly at the state level (Chau 2006, 43). In typical fashion, the PRC exploits local conditions to make donations to Nigeria that tends to endear the Chinese to many Nigerians. Without the kind of constraints imposed by the US media as well as the home population through Congress, the PRC reacts quickly as was the case in its emergency relief assistance to Nigeria after an explosion at a military armory in Lagos (Chau 2006, 36). The PRC has also promised to help Nigeria drill 598 boreholes in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, as well as 18 states, all as a free aid project. The free water supply project was "aimed at providing clean drinkable water to ordinary Nigerians living in out-of-the way areas," stated PRC Ambassador to Nigeria Wang Yongqiu. Nigerian Minister of Water Resources, Alhaji Muktar Shagari, later remarked, the project "is a typical example of bilateral cooperation" between Nigeria and the PRC, and appealed to other countries to "learn from China" (Chau 2006, 2).

The US tries to dissuade Nigerians from becoming radical Islamists in order not to create a sanctuary for terrorist organizations, like Al Qaeda, in Northern Nigeria. The US Embassy in Abuja provided a collection of books, CD-ROMS, and magazines on American history, literature, education, culture and law, as well as educational advising materials as part of the "American Corner Kaduna" (Chau 2006, 13). In Africa, where

poverty levels are so high, trying to change the mindset of a people without adequate economic rewards will have virtually no effect. As a matter of fact, the American way of life is seen in most societies as violent and decadent which threatens to erode much of the cherished local cultural practices. The perceived “American lifestyle” is, in most cases, highly frowned upon by the older Africans while the youth tend to embrace such modern lifestyles.

Military Instrument of National Power

The US conducts joint exercises with the Nigerian Navy and the TSCTI is quite active in Nigeria. Although not explicitly outlined, ensuring that there is little or no disruption to the flow of oil seems to be one of the major strategic objectives of US military operations in Nigeria. In 2004 when the commander of US European Command was asked whether the TSCTI would include the protection of Nigerian oil infrastructure, he stated that “Wherever there’s evil, we want to get there and fight it” (Morris 2006, 230).

Whereas the US may have to take issues like human rights abuses and good governance into consideration before having any military interaction with Nigeria, China’s policy of non-interference into the internal affairs of a nation makes the PRC a ready market for Nigeria’s military hardware. The *Financial Times* reported on 28 February 2006 that Nigeria is shifting its sourcing for military equipment to China because US concerns about corruption within the Nigerian security forces have delayed the delivery of equipment (quoted in Wolfe 2006). On the other hand, in October 2005, it was reported that Beijing donated \$3 million worth of military equipment to Nigeria. The equipment included “two special vehicles, emergency runway systems, bullet proof

helmets and vests, communication gadgets, computers, uniforms and diving devices.”

The Chinese Ambassador to Nigeria, Wang Yongqiu, later mentioned that 21 Chinese experts would arrive in Nigeria in November to train Nigerian soldiers on how to use the equipment (Chau 2006, 2). To the Chinese, business is business and should be separated from politics. The government of Nigeria seems to find this arrangement very suitable in its attempt to curb the insurgency that has the potential of severely disrupting oil production. The Nigerian Vice President told the *Financial Times* that US cooperation was not “moving as fast as the situation is unfolding.” In that respect, Nigeria was going to obtain patrol boats from China to protect oil installations in the Niger Delta. China’s main concern seems to be to ensure that there is the necessary political stability to keep Nigeria’s oil pumping. It is not concerned what face this stability takes. On the other hand, it is Washington’s belief that democracy and transparent market economies are the best way to ensure stability (Wolfe 2006).

Economic Instrument of National Power

Both China and the US have significant investments in Nigeria, especially in the oil industry. Nigeria agreed to give China four oil exploration licenses in exchange for a commitment to invest about US\$4 billion in refining and power generation in Nigeria, in one of seven deals signed when President Hu Jintao met President Olusegun Obasanjo in May 2006. State-run energy firm, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), announced the purchase, for US\$2.27 billion, of a 45 per cent stake in a Nigerian oilfield. This was CNOOC Ltd’s largest acquisition to date (Roughneen 2006). American businessmen have significant investments in the leading oil companies in Nigeria including ExxonMobil, Chevron and Conocco Phillips. Whereas US investments are

privately owned, Chinese oil companies are either government run or parastatals, meaning that they do not have to answer to shareholders. They are therefore not accountable to any civil society organizations that will put pressure on them to ensure they operate in areas that can be said to be upholding human rights and labor laws. This “ethical advantage” enjoyed by the Chinese firms tend to undermine efforts at promoting democratic principles of good governance, corporate responsibility, accountability, and investment in human infrastructure and development (Morris 2006).

Sudan as a Case Study

Between the two economic giants, China can be said to be dominating Sudan as a consequence of two complementary activities. China’s uncontrolled search for energy supplies and Sudan’s deteriorating internal conflict situation have kept China in a position of control in Sudan. Declining security conditions, the growing abuse of human rights, and Khartoum’s alleged support for terrorism have created a vacuum that China has willingly stepped into. Since the 1980s up through the early 2000s, the worsening situation in Sudan tended to discourage American and other Western oil and other companies from operating in the country. While Chevron finally abandoned its investments in Sudan's oilfields in 1992 for security reasons, other US companies (such as Occidental Petroleum Corporation) have been barred by Congress from dealing with Sudan for Sudan’s support of international terrorism. China has quickly filled the gap (Shichor 2005).

Although the US withdrew its operations from Sudan, it still engages in some amount of interaction using the DME instruments of national power, albeit, not nearly as much as China does. Due to the precarious situation in Sudan, the impact of any

employment of the Informational instrument of national power is not very significant in both superpowers' interaction with Sudan and will thus not be discussed.

Diplomatic Instrument of National Power

Much of the interaction between the US and Sudan is only for humanitarian assistance purposes. In May 2001, Secretary of state Colin Powell, visited Nairobi and Kampala in Kenya and Uganda respectively, where he announced that the US would provide \$60 million in humanitarian assistance to persons in need both in Southern and Northern Sudan. He also mentioned that a special envoy was soon to be announced to contribute to an international effort to reach a negotiated, just settlement to Sudan's North/South conflict and that the US would pursue an even-handed approach to bring pressures and inducements to bear upon both Khartoum and southern opposition (Morrison 2001, 37). The administration appointed former Senator Danforth as Presidential Envoy for Sudan and Andrew Natsios as Humanitarian Coordinator specifically for Sudan (The White House n.d.).

The US continues to push for the UN Security Council to intervene in the Darfur crisis. The PRC, given the international spotlight on the Darfur issue, has given Sudan's al-Bashir government more political support. Thus, when the UN Security Council proposed a resolution in September 2005 to punish Sudan for failing to stop atrocities in the troubled western region of Darfur, it was forced to water down the proposal to avoid a Chinese veto. China, Russia, Pakistan, and Algeria all abstained in the vote for the weaker resolution that passed by 11-0 (Roughneen 2006). In effect, as the US continues to engage in efforts to ensure the al-Bashir government is held accountable for human right abuses in Sudan, China seems to be content working with that government.

Military Instrument of National Power

According to Brookes and Shin, China has a history of selling weapons and arms through state enterprises and front companies to repressive regimes in Africa. They indicate that "... [N]early 80 percent of Sudan's \$500 million annual oil revenue is used to purchase weapons to subdue the rebels in southern Sudan" (Brookes and Shin 2006). China's military support is also seen in the Sudanese government's use of Chinese-made helicopter gunships based at airstrips maintained by Chinese oil companies. The helicopter gunships are purportedly used by the Sudanese government troops and government-allied militias in perpetrating genocide against Sudan's black citizens. Moreover, 4,000 People Liberation Army troops were deployed in southern Sudan to guard an oil pipeline (Mbaye 2006).

US military effort in the Sudan can only be linked indirectly to the training that some other African nations' peacekeepers might have received under ACRI or the ACOTA initiatives. A number of troops deployed in the Darfur region under the auspices of the AU had earlier received some training under both initiatives. China's military involvement in Sudan, on the other hand, can be said to be purely based on economics, that is, to sell weapons and to protect their investment in the oil industry. Human rights issues and worldwide cries of genocide are internal matters for the Sudan government to deal with as far as China is concerned.

Economic Instrument of National Power

With western and US companies out of Sudan, the stage seems set for China to engage in massive economic exploitation of Sudan's oil and minerals. The Chinese developed oil fields, built refineries, and laid two oil pipelines. Sudan, which was an oil

importer before the Chinese arrived, currently earns about US\$2 billion in oil exports each year. China first established a presence in Sudan's Muglad oil fields in 1996. As of 2005, the PRC was buying between 50 and 60 per cent of Sudan's oil exports which is about 7 per cent of China's consumption needs. China has invested more than US\$8 billion in joint exploration contracts in Sudan, including the construction of a pipeline from the southern oilfields to the Red Sea with a tanker terminal at Port Sudan. An estimated 10,000 Chinese are working in the country and China owns a 40 per cent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the major consortium drilling in Sudan (Roughneen 2006). The Chinese seem to be quite happy doing business in countries and regions that are seen to be highly unstable. It is therefore likely that the PRC will not easily give in to international pressure to help find a solution to the Darfur crisis. "There are some 3,000 Chinese citizens, mostly executives and workers of Chinese companies engaged in contracted projects, staying in Darfur" (Shichor 2005). They seem to be quite content with the economic returns they are generating even with so much alleged carnage going on in the region.

Summary of US-China Engagement in Nigeria and Sudan

It is possible to surmise that the PRC seems to have a lead in gaining footholds in Africa. This could be attributed to the fact that conditionalities and pressures from US domestic politics tend to put impediments in the way the US relates to African states. Thus, while the US is quite selective as to which countries to have extensive interaction with, China has fewer constraints and deals with many more countries. The US provides military assistance to empower African states to handle conflict situations on the continent. Such assistance is even hinged on human rights records and US congressional

control. China's military involvement in Africa is economically motivated and is less restrictive.

Both superpowers are making efforts to win the hearts and minds of the governments and people of Africa. Efforts are being made to give the Africans the opportunity to appreciate the superpowers' lifestyle and ways of doing things. Because of the visible quick results that are being seen by the majority of the African population from Chinese investments, the Chinese seem to be winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the African ruling elite. There is however growing skepticism among the African intelligentsia, local business community and NGOs about the long term effects such adventurism will have on the African society.

Finally, whereas US investments in Africa are private, Chinese companies are either government-owned or parastatal and thus usually tie infrastructure development and aid to their investment drives.

Part III

Compare Clashes with Cold War Scenarios

China is actively using history to promote its economic agenda by persistently emphasizing the common history of exploitation China and African states suffered under western colonialists. This is a common theme in many African newspapers, where commentators argue that western investors exploit Africa, while Chinese companies tend to invest in businesses that are beneficial to Africans (Mooney 2005). The US, on the other hand, uses the attractiveness of good governance and freedom to make its case with Africans. Whereas the Chinese ways and means tend to be more attractive to the ruling elites and in some cases the poor masses, the US approach tends to be more appealing to

civil society and the intelligentsia. Unlike the Cold War, which basically hinged on ideological differences, the current competition between China and the US in Africa is clearly defined on economic lines. Both countries tend to have the same goal of maintaining access to strategic resources and ensuring that the flow of natural resources can be assured without necessarily denying access to the other. The two superpowers however differ in their desire for and approach to achieving this goal. This part will analyze these differences and relate them to Cold War scenarios.

US Insistence on Democracy

China's Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong blames the West for many of Africa's problems, saying: "You have tried to impose a market economy and multiparty democracy on these countries, which are not ready for it. We are also against embargos, which you have tried to use against us" (French 2004). This position on ideological differences can be likened to the US wanting African states to adopt the capitalist way of doing things whilst the former USSR was all for the spread of communism. This situation led to the superpowers patronizing African governments so long as they showed signs of moving away from the other camp. In such a competition, virtues were sacrificed for numbers as the US, for instance, was noted to have sponsored some authoritarian regimes, like Mobutu in the former Zaire, very much against the principles that the US stands for. The big question is whether in the pursuit of democratic principles and to spite the Chinese, preferred governments would be propped up even if it causes the average Africans to be neglected and starved both politically and physically. If such a situation should arise, the Chinese are likely to step in and downplay the need for democracy to help the neglected population. These marginalized populations may subsequently rise up

against the democratic process and governments that presumably neglected them and plunge the country into chaos. In the Cold War era, superpower competitors played on the shortcomings of each other to foment internal revolts to achieve regime changes in African states which led to much instability.

Use of UN Security Council Veto Power

During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was more often than not ready to oppose any proposal put forth by the US at the UN Security Council. This situation seems to be regenerated as is reflected in the inability of the Security Council to pass any meaningful resolution on the Darfur crisis. Because of the two countries' differing national interests on the African continent, the two superpowers are likely to adopt stances which may not necessarily be in the interest of the African state or world peace at large. In such a situation either side may use the veto power to frustrate the effort of the international community to intervene in a situation that may threaten life and property. For instance, it will not be surprising if China uses its veto to prevent the UN Security Council from taking strong measures against regimes, like Mugabe's Zimbabwe or al-Bahir's Sudan, if the international community so decides.

Supply of Weapons

With so much investment on the continent, it is not surprising that both the US and China are employing the military instrument of national power to safeguard their interest. During the Cold War era, the US and the USSR engaged in a series of military activities, including arming insurgents to secure and protect their interest. Presently the supply of arms, weapons and other military equipment by the US, and particularly China,

mimics the Cold War mechanics. Eventually, such weapons, which are brought in supposedly for the governments, end up in the hands of unauthorized persons who use them for crime and political adventurism. This problem exacerbated many conflict situations on the continent with the demise of the Cold War when the superpowers left and were thus no longer providing the security for their interests on the continent. It is still very difficult to keep track and maintain control of weapons that enter many African countries. There is therefore much concern about the inflow of weapons into regions that the superpowers are heavily investing into resource extraction, with the pretext of securing their investments.

The End of the African Adventure

Both the US and China have had a series of undulating relationships with the African continent. Just like every other relationship, the interactions tend to surge and fall periodically based on the period, world conditions and the needs of the states. It is expected that this renewed increase in interest in Africa by the US and China will also eventually pass away, although this is not foreseeable within the next 20 years. Mention should be made of the fact that even if the superpowers leave Africa due to falling interests, they always leave some footprint. Commitment of resources and effort will however not be of the same magnitude and intensity as is being seen with the current increased interest.

What May Cause China to Leave Africa

Since China's foray into Africa is not based on ideology but rather on economics, it stands to reason that when it becomes no longer viable to continue with economic

activity on the continent, the PRC will leave. With oil, as the main driver for its relations with Africa, there is the belief that if, for any reason, it becomes more costly to extract and transport African oil, then China may find it necessary to look elsewhere. It is however worth mentioning that China has demonstrated a higher tolerance for instability in the African countries in which it is actively engaged, as in Sudan. There are still ongoing discussions between China and Russia to build a pipeline which will be capable of transporting as much as 1 million bpd to China. There are also efforts to secure deals in places such as Canada and Venezuela to supplement China's oil needs (Hurst 2006, 4). Once these other sources are secured, it is believed that driven by economic reasons rather than any other motive, China may pack and leave Africa if the situation warrants.

What May Cause the US to Leave Africa

It is also anticipated that if the US finds alternate sources of oil, then Africa may not receive the attention that it is getting now. In his State of the Union Address on 31 January 2006, US President Bush promised Americans that dependence on foreign oil will be reduced by reducing consumption through "increase[ing] our research in better batteries for hybrid and electric cars . . . fund additional research in cutting-edge methods" (President Bush, quoted in Morris 2006, 225). There are also ongoing research and trials for vehicles that use other sources of power including hydrogen. If competing in Africa with China is going to cost the US so much economically, diplomatically and militarily, then the likelihood of leaving Africa in the future when alternate sources of fuel are discovered is great.

Summary of Part III

While it is safe to posit that the competition between China and the US in Africa cannot be said to be the same as the Cold War model, differences between how the US and China approach issues are sources of worry. Political adventurers could exploit these differences to their advantage to foment trouble for their selfish motives. Although remote, the likelihood of the two superpowers eventually leaving the continent as well as its consequences can also not be overlooked.

Part IV

Impact of US-China competition on Stability in Africa

Oil and other natural resources have been a poisoned chalice for many African countries, despite their abundance and potential for wealth creation. Oil partly caused and financed conflict in Angola and Sudan, diamonds paid for slaughter in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the 3-4 million deaths in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since the mid-1990s can be attributed in large part to the mineral wealth in the country, as militias and foreign armies prolonged conflict to retain access to coltan ore and diamonds. (2006)

Roughneen, “Influence Anxiety: China’s Role in Africa”

The competition by the superpowers in these areas where oil have been discovered may aggravate an already potentially volatile situation. This is in view of the fact that the various stakeholders are likely to exploit the differences in the ways and means the superpowers want to pursue their interest to further their personal agenda. So long as most African societies remain dependent on foreign aid and corruption still prevails, the creation of wealth through the oil industry is likely to be used in lining individual pockets rather than the development of the society as a whole. “Yet as oil exports from sub-Saharan Africa have increased so has the poverty in oil exporting

countries . . . these corrupt leaders get richer and their citizens get poorer” (U.S. Congress, Senate 2007, 5). The weak institutional framework for governance in most African states makes them more vulnerable to corruption and eventual unrest resulting from a feeling of deprivation by a large section of the population. This could eventually erupt into intrastate conflicts as happened in countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia, to mention just a few.

It is argued by some analysts that China may not be in a position to handle its superpower status well in Africa which may lead to negative consequences resulting from its involvement. According to Andrew Small, program manager of the UK based Foreign Policy Centre, “They have achieved a position of greater importance in Africa than they probably planned to” (Rozenberg, Clayton and Duncan, 2006). There is therefore the likelihood that the African states may become too difficult for China to handle since it might not have planned for such success. The end result could become chaos and anarchy where there will be no way of keeping African states in check should there be tendencies for expansion and adventurism. Cross-border skirmishes may become the order of the day and to safeguard their territories, states may increase their sponsoring of insurgents in neighboring countries leading to a spate of internationalized intrastate conflicts.

The most pernicious effect of renewed Chinese interest in Africa is that China is legitimizing and encouraging Africa’s most repressive regimes, thereby increasing the likelihood of weak and failed states (Brookes and Shin 2006). Weak and failed states tend to lack the capacity to control crime and thus conflicts tend to be the order of the day. In such states, the only rule is survival of the fittest.

China's presence on the African market has been accompanied by an increased inflow of cheap Chinese goods that tend to be attractive to many poor Africans. Most Chinese contracts also have large Chinese work forces working on the sites in Africa. Although the PRC uses this as a means of exporting their way of life to Africa in an effort towards winning the hearts of the average African, this is becoming a double-edged sword. It has been observed that such influx of goods and resources, much of which have little to no benefit to the average African, is seriously stifling the growth of local industry in Africa, thereby resulting in exacerbation of poverty. Zambia and South Africa have been significantly affected by this phenomenon. Widespread poverty has been identified as one of the major causes of conflicts in much of African society.

Should the superpowers have the need to leave Africa for reasons enumerated earlier, it is anticipated that the superpowers will not pull out completely due to the significant investments that they would have made on the continent. It is however worthy of mention that the presence of the superpowers and their ability to help governments maintain security and stability could be suppressing underlying tensions. These may therefore erupt into intrastate conflicts once the superpowers ease their presence on the continent. The downside of this is that the continued presence of the superpowers will worsen the plight of those opposed to governments in power since the governments will have greater ability to suppress their opponents. For instance, China's support for the Sudanese government could be said to have gone a long way to ensure its stability. Should China withdraw its support for the government, the Sudanese government is likely to crumble under international pressure, with the consequence of throwing the

country into chaos as a result of the rebels being empowered by the weakening of the government.

Summary

This chapter looked at the ways and means the PRC and the US are pursuing their interests on the African continent. The DIME instruments of national power were used in analyzing how the superpowers are relating with Africa. A closer examination was conducted with Nigeria and Sudan where it was obvious that China has taken quite a lead in establishing footholds in the oil industry on the continent. In comparing the ways and means the powers are pursuing their interests to the Cold War era, it was established that the Cold War model of competition is different from the competition between China and the US, although a few similarities were observed.

Finally, the chapter looked at the impact of the competition between China and the US on the African states where it was established that there is the likelihood of intrastate conflicts erupting from the US and Chinese foray into Africa. It is worthy of note that as it is now, both the US and China are striving to maintain stability on the continent. The signals are however there for obvious tensions that may be kept in check by the military efforts of both China and the US.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The US and China have both had earlier flirtations with the African continent. The US became more interested in the African continent during the Cold War era and made significant efforts to deny as many African states as possible to the USSR, its Cold War competitor. The US ‘expedition’ into Africa during this period was thus motivated by an ideological cause to prevent communism from gaining roots in Africa. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, there was not much motivation to continue being engaged in Africa with the same level of commitment and the US thus “left Africa to its own devices in the painful pursuit of domestic political consolidation and legitimacy” (Magyar 1999, 13). China on the other hand got more involved in Africa, within the same time frame, by identifying with the African nations in their struggle for independence from colonialism. The PRC’s engagement in Africa hinged on common anti-imperialist empathy which motivated the PRC to dispatch Chinese technicians to provide military training, build hospitals, stadiums, railroads, and other infrastructure, especially to African states that were socialist oriented. In the 1980’s however, Chinese commitment in Africa fell significantly since the Chinese needed to focus much of their effort into developing China and building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the country.

The US and China are the two leading consumers of oil in the world with their consumption levels outstripping both countries’ domestic oil production levels. Both countries depend on Middle Eastern sources for a significant amount of oil imports.

However with so much insecurity in the Middle East, coupled with the fact that African

sources of oil are increasingly contributing to the superpowers' consumption needs, Africa has generated renewed interest from the two economic giants in recent times.

This study set out to establish that both the US and China have increased their interest in Africa which has resulted in a competition between the two powers on the continent. How the superpowers are pursuing their interest on the continent was analyzed using the DIME instruments of national power. The study then reviewed how the competition between the powers impacts on stability on the African continent, using the Cold War as a model of reference. This chapter will thus present the conclusions arrived at from the study and also make some recommendations.

Conclusions from the Study

Increased Superpower Interest in Africa

The US and China have both increased their presence on the African continent since 2000 for various reasons. It is however obvious that the need for resources, particularly oil, is the main driver of both superpowers' increased interest in Africa. The fast rate of development of the Chinese economy requires massive levels of natural resources, particularly oil, to sustain its growth. Domestic production of oil required to sustain the booming economy is, however, inadequate and China increasingly has to depend on imported oil. The US is the world's leading consumer of oil and is likely to maintain this position for at least the next decade. Consumption levels of oil continue to rise, although not as rapidly as that of China. On the other hand, domestic production has consistently been falling since 1985 thus annually increasing the US' dependence on imported oil.

Both countries now depend on African sources of oil for a significant portion of their imports. Whilst Nigeria is the fifth largest supplier of oil to the US, China currently depends on Sudan and other African sources for 30 percent of its oil requirements. The oil from the Gulf of Guinea in particular, is in high demand because it has been noted to be of very high quality and less expensive to refine. Also there is evidence that a large portion of African oil remains untapped and thus when fully galvanized, African sources of oil have the potential to supply a sizeable percentage of the world oil needs. The desire to secure the African sources of oil to assure the superpowers of an uninterrupted supply is of strategic importance to the two countries. The competition to achieve this strategic ends emanates from the fact that both powers cannot depend on each other to protect their interest by just allowing one power to dominate the African continent. In effect, both powers are trying to achieve the same objective of ensuring uninterrupted supply of African oil, but through different and sometimes similar ways.

How the Two Superpowers are Pursuing Their Interest in Africa

The ways and means of gaining access to the African oil differ significantly in the approaches adopted by the two powers although they both employ the DIME instruments of national power. China has already made significant incursions into Africa relative to the US due to the limited constraints on its interaction with Africa. The Chinese are ready to engage any African country where they can get resources, through all the DIME instruments of national power, without worrying about human rights issues or yardsticks like good governance, transparency and accountability. The Chinese are also able to tie their investment in the oil industry to aid programs as well as infrastructural development assistance because the Chinese firms are either state owned or parastatal.

The US, on the other hand, tries to tie its engagement with Africa to conditionalities hinging on the democratic principles of good governance, transparency, rule of law, and accountability. The US government, as well as US businesses, are presumably also very sensitive to human rights records of countries they can engage with. The US Congress, representing the US population, keeps a check on the government and businesses to ensure that African countries that are lacking in good governance as well as human rights promotion are clearly identified.

Comparison with the Cold War

From the study, it can be concluded that the Cold War model of competition can not be applied to the competition between China and the US in many aspects. The new competition is for resources and can thus be said to be more economically motivated, unlike the Cold War that hinged on ideological differences which made the Cold War more intense. Due to the nature of the Cold War, adversaries tended to appeal to sensitivities of the African society to promote their ideological interest. The sensitivities sometimes centered on tribal as well as religious differences. In an ideological competition, the target of the superpower competitors was the human beings, whose way of thinking needed to be influenced and thus their welfare became an important factor. In this economically motivated competition, both competitors tend to have access to natural resources as their target, and may thus not be too concerned about the plight of the average African. This notwithstanding, some similarities between the two competitions could be deduced.

The main similarity linking this competition and the Cold War competition between the US and the USSR identified is the fact that two superpowers are trying to

outdo each other in an effort to gain the support of African states. Both China and the US, as was the case with the Cold War competitors, both wield UN Security Council veto power which empowers them to counter each other in using the UN to pursue their individual agenda in Africa. The struggle for dominance is being conducted not in their countries but, as was the case in the Cold War, on the African continent. Another similarity between the two competitions lies in the fact the superpowers, recognizing the need to protect their interests, are actively employing the military instrument of national power in Africa. Quite a sizeable amount of weapons have found their way into the continent mainly to secure sources of natural resources and to ensure the stability of host governments. Unfortunately many African societies still lack the structures to ensure that these weapons are well controlled.

As it was with the Cold War, it is anticipated that the competition between China and the US will eventually ease off, if not end completely. The departure of the superpowers could be prompted by the situation where African sources of oil become less economically viable for the superpowers' continued investment. Although this situation seems very remote given current trends, it is a source of worry for many Africans. The transition from the increased presence of the superpowers on the African continent to their departure can create a vacuum which could be exploited by political adventurers to vent out suppressed tensions.

Impact of the Competition on Stability in Africa

The need for the US and China to ensure an uninterrupted supply of oil and other critical resources has led to the implementation of a series of programs aimed at providing security and stability on the African continent. Both powers' employment of

the military instrument of power is basically aimed at achieving this all important goal. It is however safe to mention that the recent increased presence of the superpowers in Africa has a potential for instability on the continent.

The lack of structures and capacity to control the weapons that are flowing into Africa to secure sources of natural resources is of concern to many since the weapons have the potential to escalate an already tense environment in the resource-rich areas of Africa. The influx of cheap Chinese goods into Africa is also a source of worry since its stifling of local industries leads to exacerbation of poverty with resultant unrest in society.

The competition between the two powers also has the potential of further dividing the African society if the superpowers engage different groups to outdo each other in specific countries. In an attempt to promote a particular lifestyle or principle, there is the likelihood that the superpowers may patronize a section of a country and isolate another section which may lead to conflict based on perceived marginalization. Perceived marginalization of a section of African society has, in the past, incensed ethnic and religious sentiments to influence intrastate conflicts on the continent. China's continued support for repressive regimes could also potentially lead to the creation of failed states where anarchy and lawlessness prevail.

Recommendations

Based on the study conducted, it seems obvious that China's supposed non-intervention in the internal affairs of African states tends to give it a marked advantage over the US in their interaction with Africa. The following are thus recommended to even the field of competition:

1. African leaders should be more sensitive to the needs of the populace when engaging both Chinese and American investors to conduct business on the continent.
2. China should be encouraged to be more sensitive to human rights issues on the African continent.
3. The US Congress should be encouraged to ease some of the restrictions that tend to put impediments in the processes of interaction between Africa and the US government as well as US businesses.
4. The US and China should be encouraged to desist from engaging in a win-lose, Cold War model of competition.

It can also be deduced from the study that intrastate conflicts may eventually be exacerbated on the African continent due to the competition between the two superpowers. The following recommendations are thus made to reduce the incidence and the impact of such conflicts on the continent:

1. The influx of weapons into Africa to protect superpower interests should be curtailed.
2. Efforts should be made to ensure equitable distribution of returns on natural resources in Africa to the domestic population.
3. Good governance, transparency and accountability should be encouraged in the African society.
4. Withdrawal from the African continent by the superpowers, if the need arises, should be gradual and phased, not abrupt.
5. Efforts should be made to educate the average African on the motives behind the superpowers' foray into the continent.

6. The US and China should both be encouraged to avoid appealing to religion and ethnicity in their interaction with the African society.

7. The US and China should avoid domestic national interest biases in handling Security Council matters relating to Africa.

Recommendations for Further Study

This study basically looked at one of the strategic ends that China and the US aim to achieve with their renewed interest in Africa. This was identified to be the need to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil and other natural resources from Africa. The ways of achieving the ends was analyzed using the DIME instruments of power. The research however did not delve much into the means, that is, what resources the superpowers are using in achieving the ends. It is therefore recommended that further studies be conducted in this area with a view to finding out how much resources are being committed by the superpowers in this competition on the African market. This may help in identifying the costs of the competition to the superpowers and in effect lead to an understanding of whether it is justifiable to continue with the foray into Africa, or possibly look elsewhere for alternate sources to African oil.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the US and China have increased their presence on the African continent significantly because of the strategic need to ensure uninterrupted supply from African sources of oil. The two superpowers, who are the first and second leading consumers of oil in the world, are employing all the DIME instruments of national power to engage African states. This is to ensure that their interests on the continent are assured

and this engagement has generated a kind of competition between the US and China in Africa.

The new competition between the US and China cannot be modeled on the same lines as the Cold War competition between the US and the USSR since the underlying themes of economics and ideology, respectively, are significantly different. There are however some similarities in both competitions as they relate to Africa. Based on the African experiences of the Cold War competition, these similarities have the potential of exacerbating the existing tense situations that prevail in much of African society. Armed with the knowledge that the competition between the superpowers could lead to conflicts, efforts need to be made to reduce the incidence as well as the effect of these potential conflicts.

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